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CRYSTAL EASTMAN AND THE
INTERNATIONALIST BEGINNINGS OF
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
JOHN FABIAN WITT†
ABSTRACT
The modern American civil liberties movement famously began
with the United States’s intervention in World War I. Yet these
beginnings have long raised a conundrum for civil liberties historians.
Why did the American civil liberties movement arise precisely when
so many sophisticated legal and political thinkers began to call into
question the truth value of abstract rights claims? The puzzling rise of
civil liberties in an age of pragmatic skepticism is all the more startling
given that early leaders of the civil liberties movement were themselves
leading rights skeptics. This Article offers a new interpretation of the
rise of the modern American civil liberties movement. Our ostensibly
domestic civil liberties movement—and indeed, the phrase “civil
liberties” itself—has its roots in a pre-World War I international law
cosmopolitanism. In particular, the social movement that coalesced
around the phrase civil liberties developed as a group of selfconsciously internationalist organizations. Led by people such as
Crystal Eastman, a little-remembered, charismatic, progressive-era
reformer and radical, these organizations had begun to question not
just the abstract metaphysical truth of rights claims but also the
usefulness of that other great abstraction of nineteenth-century law:
sovereignty. The civil liberties movement in American law thus did
indeed emerge out of a pragmatist critique of abstract legal fictions.
The relevant abstraction, however, was not so much the formal
concept of rights as the formal concept of nation-state sovereignty.
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With American intervention in World War I, obligations of loyalty to
the nation-state compelled American internationalists such as
Eastman, her colleague Roger Baldwin, and the fledgling American
Civil Liberties Union to reframe their critique of sovereignty in terms
made available by the constituent documents of American
nationalism.

INTRODUCTION
A paradox haunts the history of civil liberties in the United
States. The Bill of Rights notwithstanding, it took well over a century
for U.S. law to develop protections for dissenting or unpopular
speech. Both the phrase “civil liberties” itself and the civil liberties
tradition as twenty-first-century American lawyers understand it—a
body of legal protections for rights such as speech and assembly—
date to World War I. Yet the years leading up to the war witnessed
the emergence of powerful challenges to the very ideas of “rights”
and “liberty” on which a civil liberties movement might be thought to
depend. Indeed, many early architects of the civil liberties movement
were themselves leading rights-skeptics and builders of the kinds of
modernist legal institutions that sought to consign rights talk to a
nineteenth-century past.1
One prominent response to the paradox seeks to connect the
advent of civil liberties to the distinctively American philosophical
tradition of pragmatism and its jurisprudential analogues. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously contended in 1919 that pragmatic
uncertainty as to ultimate truths ought to lead nation-states to be
reluctant to prohibit the expression of even apparently abhorrent
ideas. “[T]ime,” Holmes wrote in his dissent in Abrams v. United
2
States, “has upset many fighting faiths.” It followed for Holmes that
nation-states should establish the kinds of protections for speech and
expression that Americans today would describe as central elements
of the civil liberties agenda. Yet until Holmes’s suggestion in 1919,
pragmatism had more often undermined rights claims. Pragmatist
philosopher John Dewey scorned those who clung to “the

1. Thomas L. Haskell, The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk in the “Age of
Interpretation,” in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 324, 328–29 (David Thelen ed.,
1988).
2. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an especially elegant version of
this solution, see LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA
(2001).
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3
individualistic tradition” of “early Victorian platitudes” about “the
sanctity of individual rights.”4 Critics noted that the problem of
uncertainty to which Holmes pointed in Abrams cut both ways,
calling into question not only legislative commitments to the
suppression of particular ideas, but also the unyielding commitment
5
to principle that underlay rights claims in times of crisis. And indeed,
as American intervention in World War I approached, lawyers like
Raymond Fosdick (soon to become the first undersecretary general
of the League of Nations) increasingly saw “‘natural rights’” along
with “Jefferson and laissez-faire” as just so many “mental trappings”
from “a century ago.”6 As Ernest Hemingway would write, the war
had called into question the power of “[a]bstract words such as glory,
7
honor, courage, or hallow”—and, one might add, liberty and rights.
A second response to the civil liberties paradox sees in World
War I what political scientist Samuel Huntington would call a
moment of “creedal passion”: a confrontation between the nation and
8
its deepest values. Federal legislation effectively criminalized antiwar
speech; the Post Office barred antiwar and radical literature from the
mails; mobs brutalized and even lynched antiwar speakers; and
federal agents and allied vigilantes led lawless raids on labor unions
and radical organizations. Events such as these, the second account
contends, touched off a movement on behalf of ideas about rights that
Americans had long held but taken for granted.9 Yet there is

3. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY 50 (1980).
4. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 3 (1997).
5. RANDOLPH S. BOURNE, The War and the Intellectuals, in WAR AND THE
INTELLECTUALS: COLLECTED ESSAYS, 1915–1919, at 3, 11 (Carl Resek ed., 1964).
6. Raymond B. Fosdick, Liberty in America, OUTLOOK, Feb. 2, 1916, at 282, 285.
7. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, A FAREWELL TO ARMS 196 (1929); see also PAUL FUSSELL,
THE GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY 21 (1975) (describing Hemingway’s
disillusionment).
8. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 85
(1981).
9. E.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”:
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 389–94 (2000); DONALD
JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOMS: WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, at vii–ix (1963); KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 72–92; PAUL
L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 26–
30 (1979); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 138–44 (1999);
SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 11–47
(1999); Robert E. Cushman, The Repercussions of Foreign Affairs on the American Tradition of
Civil Liberty, 92 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 257, 257 (1948). For a recent summary of this view, see
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remarkably little evidence of a long-standing American civil liberties
tradition in nineteenth-century American law. As one historian puts
10
it, the nation’s civil liberties record instead “seems terribly dismal.”
The civil liberties violations of the World War I period were not so
different from those of the Civil War. As one prominent supporter of
the war noted in 1918, Lincoln’s “limitations of free speech” provided
11
a model for the Wilson administration a half-century later. Indeed,
American law had long been characterized by a wide array of
practices that by later standards seem clear violations of important
civil liberties. Southern states banned antislavery literature and
speech. Congress stifled abolitionist petitions. Congress and the states
alike prohibited the dissemination of birth control literature and
sexually explicit materials. Laws prohibited entertainment on
Sundays. Courts broadly enjoined peaceful labor picketing. And
communities participated in repressing the free speech efforts of
organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).12
Historian Henry Steele Commager plausibly wrote of the period
between 1789 and 1937 that there had not been “a single case, in a
century and a half, where the Supreme Court has protected freedom
of speech, press, assembly, or petition against congressional attack.”13
Nineteenth-century American law, in short, seems to have borne out
James Madison’s warning that the provisions of the Bill of Rights

Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV.
1, 34–38 (1996).
10. Michael Les Benedict, Victorian Moralism and Civil Liberty in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 91, 109 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992).
11. Letter from William English Walling to L. Hollingsworth Wood (Jan. 7, 1918),
microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917–
1950, Reel 1, vol. 3 (Scholarly Res., Inc.) [hereinafter ACLU Archives]; see generally MARK E.
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)
(describing Lincoln’s wartime speech policies); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERROR 108–19
(2004) (same).
12. On nineteenth-century restraints on speech and other expressive activity, see generally
CURTIS, supra note 9; RUSSEL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830–1860 (1949); RABBAN, supra note 4; John W. Wertheimer, Free
Speech Fights: The Roots of Modern Free-Expression Litigation in the United States 51–67
(1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
13. MURPHY, supra note 9, at 9 (quoting Henry Steele Commanger).
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would be mere “parchment barriers” to acts of government
14
repression.
In sum, neither of these home-grown traditions—neither the
philosophical tradition of pragmatism, nor an ostensible moment of
truth for America’s civil libertarian values—provides an especially
satisfying explanation of the modern civil liberties movement. Neither
account, moreover, offers a solution to the paradox of rights-claims in
an age of skepticism.
An important feature of the beginnings of the American civil
liberties tradition has gone missing from domesticated historical
accounts. The modern civil liberties movement, as well as the phrase
“civil liberties” as a language with which to organize that movement,
arose out of a pre-World War I transatlantic internationalism that
transcended the national boundaries of the United States. Late
nineteenth century internationalists had begun to question not just
the abstract metaphysical truth of rights claims but also the usefulness
of that other great abstraction of nineteenth-century law: the
sovereignty of the nation-state. The civil liberties movement in
American law did indeed emerge out of a pragmatist critique of
abstract legal fictions. The relevant abstraction, however, was not so
much the formal concept of rights as the formal concept of state
sovereignty.
This Article describes the connections between the movement
that contemporaries called “internationalism” and the beginnings of
the twentieth-century civil liberties tradition. No one better captures
these connections than Crystal Eastman, an indefatigable and
charismatic, though now largely forgotten, young New York lawyer.
Between 1913 and 1917, she became one of the most important
figures in early-twentieth-century American internationalism. And in
1917 she and Roger Baldwin founded the predecessor organization to
the American Civil Liberties Union. Yet a domestic civil liberties
movement had not been Eastman’s aim at all. For Eastman and a
like-minded group of transatlantic internationalists, the war
occasioned a struggle for new supranational institutions to constrain
the excesses of nation-states that the war had so plainly revealed.
When the patriotic obligations of wartime placed new limits on
internationalism, American internationalists like Eastman turned to

14. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS 418, 420 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
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civil liberties as a way to constrain those excesses that could be rooted
in the language and constitutive documents of American nationalism.
Within a very short time, however, the civil liberties strategy
swallowed up and replaced the internationalist agenda it had been
designed to advance.
If the story told here is successful, a number of interesting points
about American civil liberties and international law follow. The
internationalist beginnings of American civil liberties help to explain
the paradox of civil liberties in an age of pragmatism. Rights-skeptics
in the early twentieth century were grappling not with one but with
two conceptual abstractions: rights and sovereignty. If they seized on
the former, they did so because it seemed to them less dangerous than
the latter. Critiques of sovereignty also help to explain the
exceptionally prominent role of women in the American civil liberties
movement. Women like Crystal Eastman were especially quick to
recognize the dangers posed by nation-states in which they had long
possessed only attenuated forms of membership. Nation-states had
barred women from voting and had even stripped them of their
citizenship when, like Eastman in 1916, they married foreign
nationals.
Moreover, the internationalist beginnings of American civil
liberties suggest that even those features of American law that are
typically described as distinctive—such as the United States’s
emphasis on the civil liberties of individuals—are often the result of
interactions and ideas on a global scale. For almost three decades
now, historians and lawyers have chipped away at the myths of
American exceptionalism in such areas of the law as torts, crime,
labor, and the constitution,15 and such areas of reform as urban
16
planning, social insurance, and even home economics. In these areas

15. E.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING
JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 71–72 (2003); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF
AMERICAN LAW 2–21 (2004); A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (Margaret K. Rosenheim,
Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus, & Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002); William E. Forbath,
Law and the Shaping of Labor Politics in the United States and England, in LABOR LAW IN
AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 201 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King
eds., 1992).
16. E.g., JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870–1920, at 3–11 (1986); DANIEL
T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 2–7 (1998);
Kristin Hoganson, Cosmopolitan Domesticity: Importing the American Dream, 1865–1920, 107

WITT FINAL.DOC

2004]

8/12/2005 10:49 AM

INTERNATIONALISM & CIVIL LIBERTIES

711

and elsewhere, it now appears, American law and politics developed
17
not in isolation but in robust transoceanic conversations. By the
same token, the American civil liberties movement has not been
merely a U.S. product for export to the world, though it has
sometimes been that.18 Civil liberties have instead been part of an
import/export business, as ideas drawn from transatlantic and
European currents in international law were fed back into circulation
as civil liberties claims.
Much as in World War I, twenty-first-century crises once again
pit obligations of national loyalty against aspirations to an
international rule of law. One lesson of civil liberties and American
internationalism may be that such moments of conflict over questions
of national loyalty have helped to shape some of the United States’s
most basic legal commitments. But another lesson appears to be that
such moments can be full of irony and unanticipated consequences.
National conflict, it seems, sometimes shapes the United States in
ways that few participants either foresee or intend.
I. CATHERINE CRYSTAL EASTMAN AND THE CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS
Catherine Crystal Eastman hailed from the heart of the
nineteenth-century American reform tradition. In the words of her
brother, the eclectic aesthete and radical editor Max Eastman, he and
Crystal grew up near the “center of gravity” of the “moral and
religious map of the United States.”19 She was born in 1881 in
Glenora, New York, not far from where the Seneca Falls Convention
had issued the Declaration of Sentiments in 1848 to mark the
beginnings of the nineteenth-century woman’s movement. Her

AM. HIST. REV. 55, 55–83 (2002); Daniel T. Rodgers, An Age of Social Politics, in RETHINKING
AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE 250, 254–60 (Thomas Bender ed., 2002); Robert
Wiebe, Framing U.S. History: Democracy, Nationalism, and Socialism, in RETHINKING
AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE, supra, at 236, 236–49.
17. Much of the focus of recent work is on transatlantic conversations, but there is now
some work on parallel transpacific conversations. E.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 2–14 (2004); Dirk Hoerder, From
Euro- and Afro-Atlantic to Pacific Migration System: A Comparative Migration Approach to
North American History, in RETHINKING AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE, supra note
16, at 195, 198–200; Adam McKeown, Ritualization of Regulation: Enforcement of Chinese
Exclusion in United States and China, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 377, 385–91 (2003).
18. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 148–59 (1990); William P. Alford, Exporting
“The Pursuit of Happiness,” 113 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1699 (2000) (reviewing THOMAS
CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999)).
19. MAX EASTMAN, ENJOYMENT OF LIVING 1 (1948).
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mother, Annis Ford Eastman, attended Oberlin College, Ohio’s
center of abolitionist activism. Her father, Samuel Eastman, served
and was wounded in the Civil War. Both became Congregational
ministers in upstate New York, where they eventually moved to the
Park Church in Elmira. The Park Church was among the nation’s
leading churches. In 1870, Mark Twain had married the daughter of a
prominent Elmira family at the Park Church. The Church’s
abolitionist pastor, Thomas Beecher, belonged to one of the most
prominent families in America. His sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe, the
author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, was (in words attributed to Abraham
Lincoln) the “little woman who wrote the book that started” the Civil
War.20 His brother, Henry Ward Beecher, succeeded their father,
Lyman Beecher, as America’s most influential preacher. And in 1889,
upon Thomas Beecher’s death, Crystal’s parents jointly assumed the
church pastorate that Beecher had held for thirty-five years.21
In Elmira, Crystal and her brothers Max and Anstice grew up in
a home that embraced the tenets of nineteenth-century reform
movements, the woman’s movement foremost among them. At least
in part at Crystal’s insistence, the household “was run on feminist
principles”;22 there was, as she later explained, “no such thing in our
23
family as boys’ work and girls’ work.” As a fifteen-year-old, Crystal
read a paper—“Woman”—at a woman’s movement symposium
organized by her mother. Crystal’s unfeminine behavior often
scandalized the community. She wore “bathing suits without the
customary stockings and skirts,” her biographer writes, and she
refused to ride horses sidesaddle.24 Taking the woman’s movement’s
goal of “woman’s rights” as their standard, Annis and Samuel
Eastman organized their children’s upbringing around their rights as
individuals, unencumbered by the happenstance of such things as
gender. As Annis told her children from early on, the ideal of the
Eastman household and of nineteenth-century American reform

20. JOAN D. HEDRICK, HARRIET BEECHER STOWE: A LIFE, at vii (1994).
21. MAX EASTMAN, HEROES I HAVE KNOWN 1–15 (1942); Blanche Wiesen Cook,
Introduction to CRYSTAL EASTMAN, CRYSTAL EASTMAN ON WOMEN & REVOLUTION 1, 4
(Blanche Wiesen Cook ed., 1978); Sylvia A. Law, Crystal Eastman: NYU Law Graduate, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1963 (1991).
22. EASTMAN, supra note 21, at 8–9.
23. Crystal Eastman, Mother-Worship, in TOWARD THE GREAT CHANGE: CRYSTAL AND
MAX EASTMAN ON FEMINISM, ANTIMILITARISM, AND REVOLUTION 193, 196 (Blanche Wiesen
Cook ed., 1976).
24. Cook, supra note 21, at 9.
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movements (from abolition to married women’s property laws to
25
temperance) was that each human being “be an individual.”
“Nothing you can gain,” Annis warned them, “will make up for the
26
loss of yourself.” “Conformity with the crowd” was anathema when
it involved the individual’s “sacrifice of principle.”27
By the late nineteenth century, however, the American reform
tradition into which Crystal Eastman had been born began to lose its
way. The abolition of slavery removed the tradition’s greatest
campaign, and although some abolitionists turned their attention to
the “wage slavery” that accompanied free-labor capitalism,
considerably less moral fervor coalesced around alternative forms of
labor exploitation.28 In the Beecher family alone, Harriet Beecher
Stowe turned from writing antislavery novels to running a Florida
29
plantation worked by poorly paid black agricultural workers. Closer
to Elmira, Henry Ward Beecher had been brought low by the media
spectacle of an apparent affair with the wife of a prominent
parishioner.30 To be sure, the woman’s movement that had begun at
Seneca Falls continued. But the “New Departure” for women’s
suffrage and political equality that the leaders of the nineteenthcentury woman’s movement pursued beginning in the 1870s had
sputtered; despite a modest string of successes in western states from
1887 to 1896, not a single state had enfranchised women between
1896 and 1910.31 As Max Eastman would later remark about Mark
Twain, by the turn of the century old Elmira and the nineteenthcentury reform tradition seemed more and more like they “belonged
to the ‘old regime.’”32
In the new century in which Crystal Eastman came of age,
Americans were beginning to grope toward new ways of articulating
the relationships between individuals and their communities—ways

25. Blanche Wiesen Cook, Introduction to TOWARD THE GREAT CHANGE: CRYSTAL AND
MAX EASTMAN ON FEMINISM, ANTIMILITARISM, AND REVOLUTION, supra note 23, at 15, 17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
1770–1823, at 275 (1975).
29. HEDRICK, supra note 20, at 330.
30. RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, TRIALS OF INTIMACY: LOVE AND LOSS IN THE BEECHERTILTON SCANDAL (1999).
31. Sylvia A. Law, Crystal Eastman: Organizer for Women’s Rights, Peace, and Civil
Liberties in the 1910s, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1305, 1310 (1994).
32. EASTMAN, supra note 19, at 330.
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that purported to reject the abstract rights claims and individualism of
nineteenth-century liberalism in favor of historicized conceptions of
society and politics as organic, evolutionary, and deeply
33
interdependent. Eastman plunged into the center of the new
conversation about social politics in European and American
thought. After graduating from Vassar College, and with the strong
encouragement of her mother, Eastman entered Columbia University
in the fall of 1903 to pursue a graduate degree in political economy.
Although Eastman would spend only a year at Columbia, she took
two courses each with the men who had made Columbia a center for
the study of new ideas in economics and sociology: John Bates Clark,
pioneering economist and cofounder of the iconoclastic American
Economic Association, and Franklin Henry Giddings, one of
America’s leading sociologists.34
Clark, like many other prominent late nineteenth-century
American economists, had done graduate work in economics in
Germany in the 1870s, where he developed a deep respect for
socialist ideas that emphasized cooperation over individualism. The
German school of historical economics in which Clark studied argued
that classical economists such as Ricardo and Malthus had failed to
account for the apparent growth of poverty and inequality in
industrializing economies. As history veered toward greater and
greater interdependence among individuals, the German historicists
argued, the state was required to take on wider and wider
responsibilities in economic life. Clark quickly came to agree. By the
time he returned to the United States, Clark was convinced of the
35
“beauty” and “altruism” of “the socialistic ideal” as against the
selfish advancement of the strong over the weak in individualism.
Over time, Clark would pull back from his endorsement of socialist
principles; by the time Eastman arrived at Columbia, Clark had
become better known for his groundbreaking ideas in the field of

33. THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF
AUTHORITY 24–47 (1977); KLOPPENBERG, supra note 16, at 107–14; DOROTHY ROSS, THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, at xiii–xxii (1991); MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 47–58 (1949).
34. Letter from Annis Ford Eastman to Catherine Crystal Eastman (July 16, 1903) (on file
with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 5, Folder 132); Academic Transcript of
Catherine Crystal Eastman (June 8, 1904) (on file with Columbia University).
35. ROSS, supra note 33, at 107.
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marginalist economics. But Clark remained a committed—if
36
moderate—progressive into the twentieth century.
Giddings’s influence on Eastman appears to have been still more
important than Clark’s. Giddings was a leader in the use of statistical
techniques in the social sciences; as one scholar later put it, Giddings
sought to make sense of social phenomena “in terms of chance and
probability.”37 As the holder of the first chaired professorship in
sociology in the United States, Giddings conceived his subject not as
the study of individuals in isolation but as the study of individuals in
the groups in which they inevitably found themselves. Sociology was
the study of “the phenomena presented by aggregations of living
beings,” Giddings wrote in an article that he drafted while Eastman
was enrolled in his classes.38 Such aggregations, he argued, had
enormous influence on individuals’ behavior. Society, in Giddings’s
conception, was an “organization for the promotion of . . . efficiency
by means of standardization and discipline,” a “norm” that
functioned to control “the variations from itself” such that individual
behaviors would generally be found “clustering” around it.39 Given
the structures of “social pressure” that constituted modern social life,
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century individualism and natural rights
ideas were simply beside the point. “The aggregation of human
beings into communities” necessarily occasioned “restrictions of
liberty.”40 Indeed, individualism in the nineteenth-century sense was
little more than the “riotous use” of power by those who had it.41
Rights, in turn, were mere “legal forms of freedom” that had given
42
rise to “conditions of great and increasing inequality.” To be sure,
Giddings was no socialist. “Utopian collectivism” was as distasteful to

36. Id. at 106–22.
37. F.H. Hankins, Franklin Henry Giddings, 1855–1931: Some Aspects of His Sociological
Theory, 37 J. AM. SOC. 349, 359 (1931).
38. Franklin H. Giddings, The Concepts and Methods of Sociology, 10 AM. J. SOC. 161, 161
(1904); see also FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF HUMAN SOCIETY 144–53
(1922).
39. F.H. Giddings, Social Self-Control, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 569, 574, 579, 581 (1909); see also
Clarence H. Northcott, The Sociological Theories of Franklin H. Giddings, 24 AM. J. SOC. 1, 12
(1918).
40. Giddings, The Concepts and Methods of Sociology, supra note 38, at 161.
41. Franklin H. Giddings, Book Review, 17 POL. SCI. Q. 704, 706 (1902) (reviewing
EDMOND KELLY, GOVERNMENT OF HUMAN EVOLUTION (1901)); see also Giddings, supra note
39, at 574, 579, 581, 588.
42. Franklin H. Giddings, The Measurement of Social Pressure, 11 PUBLICATIONS AM.
STAT. ASS’N 56, 56 (1908).
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43
44
him as individualism run amok. But a “third and middle view,”
which combined the cautious use of the state with reasonable
competitive freedoms, could ensure the proper mix of liberty and
equality. Ultimately, the proportions of restraint and liberty that were
“conducive to the general welfare” turned on the “normal social
constraint” in the community and the “stage of its evolution” in
history.45 This was the “supremely important question in all issues of
public policy.”46 Giddings had no doubt that the balance would be
difficult to strike in particular cases.47 He was just as certain, however,
that the instruments of the social policymaker were the insights of
sociology and statistics, not old nostrums about rights and
individualism.48
Eastman may not have imagined that she would put Giddings’s
ideas to use any time soon. In 1904, she left Columbia after what may
have been either a bad final examination experience or an encounter
with Giddings’s increasingly dim view of the place of women in public
life.49 She decided instead to go into law. A career in the law was a
bold decision for a woman in 1904 and 1905. Of all the major
American professions, law was probably the most unwelcoming to
women. In 1873, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Illinois’s
refusal to admit Myra Bradwell to the state bar, Associate Justice
Joseph P. Bradley explained that “nature herself” had made women
unfit to join the bar; their “paramount destiny and mission,” Justice
50
Bradley wrote, was service as wives and mothers. Although
Bradwell was eventually admitted to practice in Illinois after an 1873
change in the state’s law, no woman was admitted to practice law in
Eastman’s home state of New York until 1886. By 1910, there were
only 133 women among the 17,000 lawyers across the state, and only
558 women among the more than 114,000 lawyers nationwide. Even

43. Franklin H. Giddings, Government or Human Evolution: Individualism and
Collectivism by Edmond Kelly, 17 POL. SCI. Q. 704, 706 (1902).
44. Franklin H. Giddings, The Natural Rate of Wages, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 620, 621 (1887).
45. Giddings, supra note 39, at 588; see also Franklin H. Giddings, A Theory of Social
Causation, PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. ASS’N (3d Series, vol. 5), May 1904, at 139, 167–68.
46. Giddings, supra note 39, at 588.
47. Giddings, supra note 44, at 621.
48. Franklin H. Giddings & Agnes Mathilde Wergeland, The Ethics of Socialism, 1 INT’L J.
ETHICS 239, 240–41 (1891).
49. See generally Letters from Annis Ford Eastman to Catherine Crystal Eastman, May
1904 (on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 5, Folder 139).
50. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).

WITT FINAL.DOC

2004]

8/12/2005 10:49 AM

INTERNATIONALISM & CIVIL LIBERTIES

717

as late as 1920, women would make up 5 percent of all physicians and
4.7 percent of all scientists, but only 1.4 percent of all lawyers in the
51
country.
Columbia’s law school did not admit women, but the law school
at New York University did. By the time Crystal enrolled in 1905,
New York University had become the leading school for training
52
women lawyers in the United States. Crystal quickly became part of
a close-knit circle of women lawyers, and she just as quickly
developed a deep enthusiasm for the law. “I am even more wild than
before to be a lawyer,” she confided to her brother.53 By her second
year of two at law school, she had emerged as one of the school’s
leading students—the second vice-president of the class, a champion
of law school causes, and a friend of everyone from faculty members
54
to the school janitor.
But for Eastman, as for so many woman lawyers in the twentieth
century, success in law school did not translate into professional
success after graduation. She sought out a law office in which she
55
could get “started with a good practice.” “My mind is just tingling to
56
get to practising law,” she wrote to Max. In particular, she picked
out the representation of plaintiffs in negligence cases and personal
injury suits as a specialty. To be sure, relatively few accident victims
in the first decade of the twentieth century chose to sue, and
practicing in the field offered little remuneration and even less
prestige. Nonetheless, Eastman came to believe that in such cases “a

51. 4 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1910: POPULATION 1910, OCCUPATIONAL STATISTICS 54,
136–37 (1914); VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN
AMERICAN HISTORY 2, 252 (1998). Bradwell never sought admission after 1873, but she was
admitted to practice in 1890 when the Illinois Supreme Court (on its own motion) reversed itself
and approved her original 1869 application. See Susan Gluck Mezey, Myra Colby Bradwell, in
AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY ONLINE (Feb. 2000).
52. DRACHMAN, supra note 51, at 256; Law, supra note 21, at 1977.
53. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman (Nov. 28, 1904) (on file with Harvard
University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
54. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Annis Ford Eastman (Dec. 17, 1906) (on file with
Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6); Letter from Crystal Eastman to Annis
Ford Eastman (Apr. 18, 1907) (on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box
6); Letter from Crystal Eastman to Annis Ford Eastman (June 8, 1907) (on file with Harvard
University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
55. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Annis Ford Eastman (Oct. 10, 1907) (on file with
Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
56. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman (Oct. 17, 1907) (on file with Harvard
University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).

WITT FINAL.DOC

718

8/12/2005 10:49 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:705

lawyer has every chance of winning before a jury if he . . . knows the
57
business.” Yet she proved unable to get work even in this lowprestige and poorly-paid area of the law. Her connections to a few
reform-minded New York lawyers, like the prominent socialist
Morris Hillquit and leading labor lawyer George W. Alger, failed to
produce employment prospects. In fact, the refusal of male lawyers to
practice with women effectively kept her out of the profession
altogether. Crystal Eastman would never actually practice law.58
Instead, after taking the bar examination, Eastman went to
Pittsburgh in the fall of 1907 to begin what was scheduled to be a twomonth investigation of industrial accidents and the law for the
Pittsburgh Survey, a survey of social conditions in the nation’s most
important industrial city. Her friend Paul Kellogg, an editor and
progressive reformer with whom she had an ongoing flirtation, had
59
hired her onto the project. Though her interest in practicing law
initially made her a reluctant participant, she soon began to turn with
more and more energy to the investigation of industrial accidents.
Here was work that tapped both her legal training and her training in
sociology. “Strange to say,” she noted to her mother, “my spirits
thrive on all this atmosphere of death and destruction.”60 “Statistics,”
it turned out, the “records of tragedies” that she collected in the
coroner’s office, were not so much depressing as “interesting to me
sociologically.”61 Her two-month engagement turned into a full year,
and she spent the first half of 1908 bringing Giddings’ statistical
empirics to the study of work accidents, tabulating hundreds of
injuries and fatalities into carefully presented tables documenting the
human wreckage of the steel mills, coal mines, and railroads of
western Pennsylvania.62

57. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Annis Ford Eastman (Oct. 16, 1907) (on file with
Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6); see Letter from Crystal Eastman to Annis
Ford Eastman (Apr. 21, 1908) (on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers,
Box 6).
58. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman (Oct. 17, 1911) (on file with Harvard
University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6); Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman
(Oct. 4, 1911) (on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
59. WITT, supra note 15, at 126–31.
60. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Annis Ford Eastman (Sept. 21, 1907) (on file with
Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
61. Id.
62. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (1910); WITT, supra note 15, at
143–44.
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In fact, although Eastman seems to have had only the vaguest
sense of this when she began the Pittsburgh study, industrial accidents
provided an ideal field for bringing the new currents in sociological
thought to bear on the law. When she arrived in Pittsburgh in the fall
of 1907, the United States had experienced three decades of
extraordinarily high industrial accident rates. Relative to other
industrializing nations, American workplaces were characterized by
lax and poorly enforced safety regulations. The law of employers’
liability, moreover, imposed relatively few financial obligations on
employers for injuries to their employees. These factors, among
others, had combined to make American work accident rates far
greater than those in western European nations. By the first decade
of the twentieth century, leading lawyers, politicians, and muckraking
journalists alike had begun to focus public attention on the problem.63
Critics of the law of employers’ liability, as the law of torts in the
workplace was known, argued that it was based in the nineteenthcentury rights-based thinking that sociologists like Giddings now
described as anachronistic. Nineteenth-century jurists had sought to
develop the law of torts as a kind of applied discipline in liberal
political theory that would uphold each individual’s right to act as he
pleased so long as he did not do harm to others. Employees could
generally recover compensation from their employers in work
accident cases only if they could show that the employer had acted
outside the scope of its rightful sphere of action by injuring the
employee through some negligent or intentionally harmful act. If the
employer had acted within its rights (or if the employee had acted
outside his rights by a negligent act of his own), the employee could
not recover. Employees’ torts cases against employers thus turned on
an inquiry into the relative rights and duties of the parties. Yet such
inquiries all too often proved intractable. For one thing, it was
extraordinarily time-consuming and costly to conduct trials into the
nuances of the parties’ behavior. Perhaps more troublingly, it seemed
increasingly apparent that a significant percentage of work accidents
could not be traced to the fault of anyone at all. Even when no one
seemed to have acted outside of their rights, injuries occurred. Such
injuries were simply the inevitable fallout from dangerous work, and
whether or not they could be attributed to some individual or
institution’s fault, the existence of a grave social problem—the

63.

WITT, supra note 15, at 22–42.
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destitution of thousands upon thousands of families each year—
64
seemed abundantly clear.
Between 1908 and 1910, Eastman did as much as any American
lawyer to direct public discourse about work accidents away from
tortured inquiries into the rights and duties of employer and
employee, toward the aggregate treatment of social needs. Beginning
in the 1880s, western European nations—first Germany, then
England, and then France—had enacted workmen’s compensation
statutes that sought to eliminate questions of right and duty, instead
65
providing injured workers with a guaranteed insurance payment.
Injured employees were not made whole in workmen’s compensation
programs. Compensation levels sought merely to provide for their
needs, not to restore them to the status quo ante as if in response to a
violation of their rights. But for Eastman, as for Giddings before her,
talk of rights was largely a futile exercise. Employee injuries were not
so much a problem of conflicting rights and duties as a problem of
“national economy.”66 “Each year” turned out industrial injuries,
noted one student of work safety conditions, just “as surely as the
67
mills ran full and the railroads prospered.” Yet what Eastman called
the “American System” of distributing accident costs “on the basis of
old individualistic legal theory” made a “necessary national loss” into
“an absolutely unnecessary amount of national deprivation.”68 What
was needed was nothing short of a revolution in the way American
law dealt with the problem, and the statistical methods that Eastman
had learned in graduate school were (she decided) “good stuff” with
which to “start a revolution.”69 Statistics would establish that “justice
70
between individuals” was a quixotic aim in the work accident field.
All the law could do was to seek “a distribution of the loss which shall
be to the best interests of all concerned.”71 Workmen’s compensation

64. Id. at 43–70.
65. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 211–66.
66. Crystal Eastman, The American Way of Distributing Industrial Accident Losses: A
Criticism, PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. ASS’N (3d Series), Apr. 1909, at 119, 119.
67. Emory S. Bogardus, The Relation of Fatigue to Industrial Accidents, 17 AM. J. SOC. 206,
208 (1911).
68. Eastman, supra note 66, at 126.
69. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, The Three Essentials for Accident Prevention, in CRYSTAL
EASTMAN ON WOMEN & REVOLUTION, supra note 21, at 280, 281–82.
70. EASTMAN, supra note 62, at 218.
71. Id.
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statutes would vindicate the social interests that Eastman saw as the
72
proper aim of twentieth-century accident law.
Eastman’s involvement in the Pittsburgh Survey brought her to
the attention of the growing number of lawmakers interested in
substituting workmen’s compensation’s insurance system for tort
law’s rights and duties. “The book of fame,” as she put it to her
brother Max, was unrolling for her.73 By late 1908, she was actively
sought after for speaking engagements and articles on a topic that was
quickly moving to the forefront of the political agenda. And in June
1909, at the suggestion of one of her professors at Vassar, Governor
Charles Evans Hughes named her secretary to the Wainwright
Commission, created to investigate the problem of work accidents in
the state of New York and to recommend new legislation to address
it.74 Completion of her work on the Pittsburgh Survey prevented
Eastman from participating as fully in the work of the Commission as
she might have liked. But her imprint on the Commission’s influential
report—significant portions of which were allocated to her for
drafting—was abundantly evident.75
Even as the workmen’s compensation movement got underway,
however, the nineteenth-century legal tradition of liberal, rightsbased jurisprudence seemed to obstruct efforts to rationalize the law
of workplace accidents. Legislation purporting to regulate the
employment contract seemed all too often to be struck down by
courts as unconstitutional interference with rights of contract and
liberty. Eastman, like many others, feared that constitutional
provisions “originally intended . . . to safeguard the rights of the
people” would now be used to strike down the important reforms

72. Id. at 84, 188, 218.
73. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman (Mar. 24, 1909) (on file with Harvard
University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
74. Letter from Annis Ford Eastman to Crystal Eastman (May 3, 1909) (on file with
Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Paper, Box 5, Folder 159); Letter from Crystal Eastman to
Annis Ford Eastman (Mar. 28, 1908) (on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers,
Box 6); Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman (June 15, 1909) (on file with Harvard
University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
75. Letter from Crystal Eastman to J. Mayhew Wainwright (Nov. 13, 1909) (on file with the
New York Historical Society, J. Mayhew Wainwright Papers, Box 6, Folder July–Dec. 1909);
The Reminiscences of John Spargo 174 (1957) (on file with Columbia University, Oral History
Research Office); Memorandum on Division of Work on Report (n.d.) (on file with the New
York Historical Society, J. Mayhew Wainwright Papers, Box 6, Folder 1909–1912).
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76
contained in the workmen’s compensation statutes. Sure enough, in
March 1911, New York State’s highest court struck down the new
workmen’s compensation law on which Eastman had worked as a
violation of employers’ property rights.77 The rights tradition of
American law had once again obstructed the sociological
rationalization of the law.78
For many, the decision of the New York court set off a search for
ways to accommodate workmen’s compensation statutes to the
constitutional rights of employers. For Eastman, however, the court’s
decision marked the end of her involvement in sociological law
reform. The decision came at a difficult time for her. Her mother,
Annis, had died of a stroke the previous October. In January,
Eastman had come down with one of the illnesses that would plague
her for the rest of her life, causing her to return home to Elmira and
to break off her work with the Wainwright Commission. To be sure,
she had married a young man named Wallace Benedict, who shared
some of her interests in the insurance industry. But both she and Max,
who married at almost exactly the same time, seem to have rushed
into their marriages in an attempt to compensate for their mother’s
death. Already in early 1911 Crystal was beginning to dread the
impending move from the eclectic excitement of New York to
“Bennie’s” hometown of Milwaukee.79
One day after the New York court struck down the workmen’s
compensation law on which she had labored, the infamous Triangle
Shirt-Waist Fire killed 146 people only blocks from Eastman’s
Greenwich Village apartment. Many of the dead were young women
who had been working behind locked doors and ill-secured fire
80
escapes at the Triangle Shirt-Waist Company. The fire, she wrote
Max, “sank into my soul,” giving rise to a “constant stirring sense of

76.

CRYSTAL EASTMAN, Work-Accidents and Employers’ Liability, in CRYSTAL EASTMAN
supra note 21, at 269, 278–79.
77. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431, 439–48 (N.Y. 1911).
78. WITT, supra note 15, at 152–86.
79. Id. at 180–84; Letter from Wainwright Commission Staff to J. Mayhew Wainwright
(Jan. 30, 1911) (on file with the New York Historical Society, J. Mayhew Wainwright Papers,
Box 6, Folder 1911).
80. LEON STEIN, THE TRIANGLE FIRE 117, 213 (William Greider ed., 2001) (1962); DAVID
VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA 3 (2003).
ON WOMEN & REVOLUTION,

WITT FINAL.DOC

2004]

8/12/2005 10:49 AM

INTERNATIONALISM & CIVIL LIBERTIES

723

81
tragedy and horror.” Combined with the court decision of the
previous day, the Triangle Fire seemed to pose starkly the ways in
which the social reform of American law had run headlong into the
institutions of the nineteenth-century state. Eastman’s sociological
skepticism about rights and her progressive reform optimism about
the capacity of rational, sociologically informed legal institutions now
gave way to fiery radicalism. “Benevolent talk about workingmen’s
insurance and compensation” might “appease our sense of right,”
Eastman announced, but after events like the Triangle Fire “what we
want is to start a revolution.”82
Within two years, Eastman left Milwaukee—and indeed the
United States altogether—for a European tour with Bennie in tow. In
Europe, she would come into contact with the beginnings of an
internationalist movement for woman’s suffrage, a movement that
sought to transcend the boundaries of the nation-states that had so
83
long excluded women from full citizenship. What she could not have
guessed then was that the new internationalist venture on which she
had embarked would soon bring her back around to the relationship
between individual rights and the new institutions of the modern
state. This time, however, she would be a crucial figure in the
conversion of the internationalist impulse into the modern American
civil liberties tradition. Through the looking glass of internationalism,
Crystal Eastman would return to nineteenth-century rights claims as
the quintessential strategy for resistance to the modern state that she
had helped design.

II. INTERNATIONALISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY
On August 29, 1914, 1500 women paraded silently down Fifth
Avenue in New York City from Fifty-Eighth Street to Seventeenth
Street. An “intense hush prevailed” along the parade route, reported
the New York Herald, broken only by the “dirge-like roll of the

81. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman (Apr. 3, 1911) (on file with Harvard
University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6); Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman
(Feb. 6, 1911) (on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6).
82. EASTMAN, supra note 76, at 281.
83. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, Suffragists Ten Years After, in CRYSTAL EASTMAN ON WOMEN &
REVOLUTION, supra note 21, at 132, 132–35; Letter from Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman
(circa 1913) (on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 6); Letter from
Crystal Eastman to Max Eastman (Mar. 29, 1913) (on file with Harvard University, Crystal
Eastman Papers, Box 6).
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84
muffled drums” that accompanied the marchers. The great mass of
the marchers were “robed in black,” wrote the New York Times.85 In
contrast, the banner carriers, carrying a banner of a dove with an
olive branch, were dressed in white with black armbands. “There
were women of all nations,” from India and China to Russia and
Germany, “but they all wore the mourning symbol to show that”
notwithstanding the war that had broken out in Europe, “they
marched not as nations, but as sorrowing women together.”86
The Woman’s Peace Parade, which Crystal Eastman helped
organize, marked the beginnings of World War I. The parade also
touched off a movement against American intervention in the Great
War. Over the course of the next two years, the peace movement
produced a host of organizations opposed to the war and to the
United States’s possible intervention in it. With Eastman’s help,
Chicago social worker and public intellectual Jane Addams and
American woman’s suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt formed the
Woman’s Peace Party in January 1915. Eastman herself—along with
her old friend Paul Kellogg and the prominent settlement house
leader Lillian Wald—organized the American Union Against
Militarism in December and January, 1915–16. Similar associations
(with almost all of which Eastman had significant contact) included
the Union for Democratic Control, the People’s Council, the
American Conference for Democracy and Terms of Peace, the
American League to Limit Armaments, the American Neutral
Conference Committee, the Emergency Peace Federation, and the
Fellowship of Reconciliation, all of which sprung up in the period
between 1914 and 1917 in hopes of discouraging American entry into
the war.87
The Woman’s Peace Parade Committee and the organizations
that followed in its wake formed the American wing of what
international lawyer Nathaniel Berman calls “international legal

84.
85.
86.

LILLIAN D. WALD, WINDOWS ON HENRY STREET 286 (1934).
Protesting Women March in Mourning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1914, at 11.
Id.; see C. ROLAND MARCHAND, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL
REFORM, 1898–1918, at 182–84 (1972).
87. On American antiwar organizations during World War I, see CHARLES CHATFIELD,
FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE: PACIFISM IN AMERICA, 1914–1941 (1971); CHARLES DEBENEDETTI,
ORIGINS OF THE MODERN AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT, 1915–1929 (1978); MARCHAND,
supra note 86, at 148, 206–07, 256, 358 (same). Alan Dawley’s Changing the World: American
Progressives in War and Revolution, published in 2003, is uneven and unfortunately marred by a
number of errors, but is nonetheless valuable.
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88
modernism.” Indeed, when Crystal Eastman and colleagues like
Addams and Wald took up the fight against militarism and war in
1914, their efforts were the culmination of more than four decades of
ideas in the United States and in Europe about the development of
new transnational legal structures. As the symbolism of the 1914
parade indicated, among the most important of these ideas was the
notion that sovereign nation-states ought to be subordinated to
international institutions.
Discussions among “internationalists,” as they typically called
themselves, often began with an observation that (in a variety of
related forms) has continued to be made ever since, right up into
discussions of twenty-first-century globalization. Technology, they
announced, had made the world a smaller place. As Eastman’s
teacher Giddings was fond of observing, the extension of
“communication throughout the world”89 by means of a century of
technological advances, from the steamship and the railroad, to the
telegraph, the telephone, and the wireless radio, had brought the
nations, races, and civilizations of the world into closer contact than
ever before.90 International treaties and fledgling international
organizations followed. European nations signed a multilateral
convention on telegraph communications in 1865. The Universal
Postal Union followed nine years later, and in 1890 European
diplomats crafted a uniform law for the international transport of
goods by rail.91
All told, the century following the end of the Napoleonic Wars
witnessed the promulgation of an extraordinary outpouring of
92
international treaties: some sixteen thousand by one count. Many of
these were traditional bilateral treaty agreements between states. An
increasing number of them were multilateral, lawmaking treaties on

88. Nathaniel Berman, “But the Alternative Is Despair”: European Nationalism and the
Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792, 1798 (1993).
89. Franklin H. Giddings, The Heart of Mr. Spencer’s Ethics, 14 INT’L J. ETHICS 496, 499
(1904).
90. Franklin H. Giddings, Imperialism?, 13 POL. SCI. Q. 585, 596 (1898).
91. SONDRA R. HERMAN, ELEVEN AGAINST WAR: STUDIES IN AMERICAN
INTERNATIONALIST THOUGHT, 1898–1921, at 10–21 (1969); WARREN F. KUEHL, SEEKING
WORLD ORDER: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION TO 1920, at 87
(1969); GERALD J. MANGONE, A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 93–97
(1954); DAVID S. PATTERSON, TOWARD A WARLESS WORLD: THE TRAVAIL OF THE
AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT, 1887–1914, at 11–12 (1976).
92. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 196 (revised ed.,
1954).
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issues ranging from tariffs, copyrights, and patents, to the treatment
of war wounded. The crowning achievements of the multilateral
agreements of the late-nineteenth-century international lawyers were
the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Initiated by Czar Nicholas
II, who secretly feared that he would be unable to keep up in the
European arms race, the Conferences sought (among other things) to
create international agreements for the peaceful resolution of
disputes among nation-states. Although the agreements that emerged
from the Conferences were hedged with reservations, the First
Conference produced a Permanent Court of Arbitration for the
pacific resolution of international disputes.93 The Second Conference,
in turn, strengthened the Court of Arbitration and authorized the
creation of an International Prize Court to decide disputes over
vessels and cargo seized on the high seas.94 Much remained to be
done, but many participants believed that much had been
accomplished; in the words of the closing address of the Second
Conference, the Conference had made the “greatest” progress “that
mankind has ever made” toward “the maintenance of peaceful
relations between nations.”95
The Hague Conferences quickly captured the hearts and minds
of international lawyers. Even before the Hague Conferences, the
gradual development of international institutions had encouraged “a
new professional self-awareness and enthusiasm” among
international lawyers in Europe and in the United States, committed
to the spreading of what a small but enthusiastic young group of
96
European lawyers in 1867 called “l’esprit d’ internationalité.” By the
end of 1868, a cadre of international lawyers from England, Italy, and
the Netherlands began publishing a professional journal, the Revue de
droit international et de législation comparée. A professional
association, the Institut de Droit International, was founded in
Belgium in 1873. In the same year, another group of European
international lawyers formed the Association for the Reform and
Codification of the Law of Nations. Internationalism, in short, was

93. CALVIN DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCE 146–61 (1962).
94. CALVIN DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCE 289–302 (1975).
95. MANGONE, supra note 91, at 127; see also DAVIS, supra note 93; DAVIS, supra note 94.
96. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 13 (2001).
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developing an organized constituency with a professional self97
consciousness.
American internationalists followed fast on the heels of the
European international lawyers. Beginning in 1895, peace advocates,
leading businessmen, and international lawyers gathered for annual
conferences on international arbitration at Lake Mohonk in the
foothills of New York’s Catskill Mountains to discuss alternatives to
armed conflict in the resolution of disputes among nations.98 The next
year, eminent figures in business, education, the ministry, law,
medicine, and the armed forces held an American Conference on
International Arbitration in Washington; they reconvened at a
Second American Conference in 1904, at which labor unions,
chambers of commerce, and the mayors and governors of dozens of
cities and states expressed ardent support for the arbitration of
international disputes.99 In 1905, a group of international lawyers at
the Lake Mohonk Conference established the American Society for
100
International Law. The American Association for International
Conciliation was founded in 1906 to “awaken interest” in
“international law, international conduct, and international
organization.”101 The New York Peace Society, established that same
year, brought together men of affairs in New York City, as did similar
associations in places like Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, and Maryland.102
A National Peace Congress met in New York in 1907, spinning off
new peace and arbitration advocacy groups of its own, including the
American School Peace League, dedicated to teaching “broad ideas
of international justice, universal brotherhood, and world

97.
98.
99.

Id. at 12–19.
KUEHL, supra note 91, at 41–43.
AM. CONF. ON INT’L ARB., THE AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 22 AND 23, 1896 (1896); AM. CONF. ON
INT’L ARB., THE SECOND AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION HELD
IN WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 12, 1904 (1904).
100. MARCHAND, supra note 86, at 39.
101. AM. ASS’N FOR INT’L CONCILIATION, Publisher’s Introduction to OFFICIAL
DOCUMENTS LOOKING TOWARD PEACE (1917).
102. BUFFALO PEACE & ARB. SOC’Y, FIRST REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND
TREASURER (1911); CHICAGO PEACE SOC’Y, REPORT OF THE CHICAGO PEACE SOCIETY, 1912
(1913); JAY WILLIAM HUDSON, MASS. PEACE SOC’Y, WHAT IS THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM?
(1915); NEW YORK PEACE SOCIETY, OFFICERS, CONSTITUTION (1908); James Brown Scott,
Judicial Proceedings as a Substitute for War or International Self-Redress, MD. Q.,
Feb. 1910, at 1.
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103
organization” in American schools. In July 1910, wealthy publisher
Edward Ginn founded the World Peace Foundation with a grant of
$1 million, and in December of the same year, Andrew Carnegie
endowed the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with a
massive $10 million gift.104
From the proliferation of American international law and peace
organizations came what one historian has called a “veritable flood of
105
plans for world courts, world federation, and world government.”
Indeed, American international lawyers adopted an often utopian
exuberance about the prospects for international order. The
formation of international law institutions and peace organizations
led many American international lawyers—along with many of their
peers across the Atlantic—to hope that they were watching the
dawning of a “new internationalism” in which war between nationstates would be rendered obsolete as a mechanism for the resolution
of international disputes.106 A century of relative peace seemed to
have brought forth a new system of relations among states,
symbolized by the Hague Conferences. In the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, internationalists saw the progressive substitution of “the
empire of law” for the anarchy of state rivalries.107 And with the
example of the Hague Conferences before them, American
internationalists found themselves involved in an increasingly heady
new conversation about what Nicholas Murray Butler—following the
European lawyers’ esprit d’internationalité—began to call “the
international mind.”108 As early as 1889 and 1890, Secretary of State
James Blaine had described an agreement to arbitrate disputes
among western hemisphere nation-states as the new “Magna Charta”
of international peace.109 President McKinley announced at his

103. AMERICAN SCHOOL CITIZENSHIP LEAGUE: AN ELEVEN YEAR SURVEY OF THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE SCHOOL PEACE LEAGUE FROM 1908 TO 1919, at 11 (1919).
104. LARRY L. FABIAN, ANDREW CARNEGIE’S PEACE ENDOWMENT: THE TYCOON, THE
PRESIDENT, AND THEIR BARGAIN OF 1910, at 1 (1985).
105. MARCHAND, supra note 86, at 23.
106. DAVIS, supra note 94, at 19.
107. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) (July 29,
1899), 32 Stat. 1779, 187 Consol. TS 410, as amended, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 205 Consol.
TS 233.
108. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, THE INTERNATIONAL MIND: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (1912).
109. Hamilton Holt, A League of Peace, in THE EAGLE AND THE DOVE: THE AMERICAN
PEACE MOVEMENT AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1900–1922, at 17, 18 (John
Whiteclay Chambers II ed., 2d ed. 1991).
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inauguration in 1897 that the “importance and moral influence” of
arbitration among states could “hardly be overestimated in the cause
110
of advancing civilization.” Indeed, other commentators suggested
that arbitrations of nation-state disputes would complete the process
of “substituting law for war,”111 vindicate the possibility of a “spiritual
112
evolution for mankind,” and give life to an “all-embracing” idea of
“brotherly love” and a “bond of union transcending national, racial or
color lines.”113 International arbitrations would give rise to “nothing
less than a court of the nations” to decide disputes among peoples
“according to eternal principles of law and equity,” argued President
William Howard Taft.114 “Never before,” announced an advocate of
the “new internationalism,” had “there been such a universal
revulsion against force as a means of settling international
quarrels.”115 War, Andrew Carnegie declared upon the formation of
his Endowment for International Peace, had been “discarded as
disgraceful to civilized men,” much as dueling and slavery had been
discarded in the century before.116 The “glorious example of reason
and peace,” President William McKinley explained, would at last
117
triumph over “passion and war.” And, as leading American
international lawyers like Elihu Root observed again and again, the
United States—as the world’s greatest and freest republic—seemed to
have an unequaled “power and influence” in this “new era of the law

110. William McKinley, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1897), reprinted in INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1789,
TO GEORGE BUSH, 1989, at 193, 200 (1989).
111. James L. Tryon, A Permanent Court of International Justice, 22 YALE L.J. 203, 203
(1913).
112. M.A. STOBART, WOMEN AND WAR 18 (World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, vol.
3, no. 2, 1913).
113. LOUIS P. LOCHNER, INTERNATIONALISM AMONG UNIVERSITIES 12 (World Peace
Foundation Pamphlet Series, vol. 3, no. 7, 1913).
114. William Howard Taft, World Peace and the General Arbitration Treaties, in THE
EAGLE AND THE DOVE: THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY, 1900–1922, supra note 109, at 21, 22.
115. HUDSON, supra note 102, at 3.
116. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT YEAR BOOK
FOR 1911, at 3 (1912). The analogy of the abolition of war to the abolition of slavery was made
commonly. See, e.g., WALTER L. FISHER, PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE, S. DOC. NO. 64-323
(1916); JOHN HAY & ELIHU ROOT, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE
HAGUE CONFERENCES, 1899 AND 1907, at 9 (World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, vol. 3,
no. 4, 1913).
117. McKinley, supra note 110, at 200.
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of nations” to bring about “peace and justice” and “human
118
brotherhood the world over.”
Yet there were actually at least two distinct internationalisms at
work in early-twentieth-century American thinking. Many elite
international lawyers—and preeminently Elihu Root—took up the
orthodox version of American internationalism. As secretary of war
in the McKinley administration and then secretary of state under
President Theodore Roosevelt, Root helped to craft the United
States’s renewed engagement with the world after a century of
relative isolation. He shaped U.S. authority and defended U.S.
interests in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico after the SpanishAmerican War. In 1907, he cosponsored a Central American Peace
Conference that established the Central American Court of Justice.
And in that same year he orchestrated American involvement in the
Second Hague Conference. Indeed, for his efforts as secretary of state
and as a U.S. senator thereafter, and for his work as the president of
both the American Society of International Law and the Carnegie
119
Endowment, Root was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1912.
Root viewed nation-state sovereignty as the foundational
building block of international law. The law of nations, in Root’s
orthodox view, was organized around the practices and agreements of
sovereign states. “The independence of nations,” Root wrote in his
Nobel Prize address of 1912, “lies at the basis of the present social
120
organization of the civilized world.” As “between two mutually
exclusive sovereignties,” he had explained three years earlier in a
presidential address to the American Society for International Law,
“each is supreme and subject to no compulsion on its own side of the
line.”121 The world was therefore ready neither for a “parliament of
man with authority to control the conduct of nations,” nor for “an

118. Elihu Root, The Function of Private Codification (April 27, 1911), reprinted in
ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS BY ELIHU ROOT 57, 69 (Robert Bacon & James
Brown Scott eds., 1916); ELIHU ROOT, PANAMA CANAL TOLLS 27 (World Peace Foundation
Pamphlet Series, vol. 3, no. 3, 1913); Elihu Root, The Hague Peace Conferences (April 15, 1907),
reprinted in ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS, supra, at 129, 144, 134.
119. HERMAN, supra note 91, at 22–54; 2 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 3–136 (Klodd,
Mead and Co., Inc. 1964) (1938).
120. Elihu Root, Nobel Peace Prize Address (scheduled for Sept. 8, 1914, not delivered due
to war), reprinted in ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS BY ELIHU ROOT, supra note
118, at 153, 157.
121. Elihu Root, The Relations Between International Tribunals of Arbitration and the
Jurisdiction of National Courts (April 23, 1909), reprinted in ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL
SUBJECTS BY ELIHU ROOT, supra note 118, at 33, 34.
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international police force with power to enforce national conformity
122
to rules of right conduct.” Instead, people and organizations seeking
to work for world peace, Root contended, were best advised to “stand
behind the men who are in the responsible positions of
government.”123
If truth be told, even Root’s nineteenth-century orthodoxy made
room for international constraints on the sovereignty of nation-states.
In Root’s account, international law assumed the consent of all states
to a minimal baseline standard of conduct. Nations “in the exercise of
their individual sovereignty” were required to conform to “a standard
of international conduct” deduced from the “universal postulate” that
“every sovereign nation is willing at all times and under all
circumstances to do what is just.”124 Like a Lockean social contract
writ global, the implied consent of nation-states to this baseline
standard created theoretical constraints on the sovereignty of states
even under Root’s orthodox approach to the law of nations.
A second strand of American internationalism, however, focused
much more explicitly on creating international constraints on the
nation-state. “[T]o trust . . . traditional political ‘organization’ to
create peaceful relations between nations,” argued advocates of this
second strand of internationalism, inevitably involved “reliance
upon” precisely the “exaggerated nationalistic and power politics”
that had caused crises between rival powers in the first place.125
Radical internationalists like John Dewey and Jane Addams thus
sought to move beyond the building blocks of nation-states to new
international structures.
As Dewey’s inclusion in the ranks of the radical internationalists
suggests, this second approach to internationalism brought to bear the
skeptical force of pragmatic thinking on the concept of the nationstate. Jane Addams warned that “nationalistic words” and “patriotic

122.
123.

Id.
Elihu Root, The Causes of War (Feb. 26, 1909), reprinted in MISCELLANEOUS
ADDRESSES BY ELIHU ROOT 275, 277 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1917).
124. Root, supra note 121, at 35–36. On the private law analogy, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI,
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 68–73
(1989); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: A History of an Illusion,
17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 113 (1997).
125. John Dewey, Introduction to JANE ADDAMS, PEACE AND BREAD IN TIME OF WAR,
at xv (1945).
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126
phrases” were “abstractions” with dangerous power. Disputes
among nations, she argued, were like international conventions for
railroads, telegraphs, and commercial paper. They required solutions
that “transcended national boundaries” and they could not be solved
“while men’s minds were still held apart” by the “national suspicions
and rivalries” that nation-states so often generated.127 It was those
suspicions and rivalries that made the legal fiction of nation-states—
128
“artificial unit[s] of loyalty,” as Max Eastman put it—so dangerous.
Indeed, nation-state rivalries, argued Addams’s colleague Norman
Thomas, ensured that no nation could prepare to defend itself
without “awaken[ing] suspicion” among its neighbors, who would be
forced to “keep up a race in armaments” that would lead to regular
“nationalistic struggles.”129 What the radical internationalists like
Addams offered instead, Max Eastman contended in 1916, was a
world in which humanity would break the cycle of competitive
rivalries to join together in “international union.”130 War, he urged,
might thus be eliminated “exactly as the wars of family and clan and
city” had been “eliminated by national union.”131
As World War I approached, Crystal Eastman joined the
increasingly vocal cadre of radical internationalists who argued that
nationalism (though only recently a positive force for the selfdetermination of peoples) had become a Trojan horse for militaristic
arms races among European powers. There were, to be sure, a variety
of different approaches even within the radical wing of American
internationalism. Norman Thomas held a Christian-pacifist
“internationalism based on the universal brotherhood of the children
of God.”132 Others came to internationalism from the perspective of

126. Jane Addams, The Revolt Against War, in WOMEN AT THE HAGUE: THE
INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONGRESS OF 1915, at 69, 72 (Mary Jo Deegan ed., 2003).
127. ADDAMS, supra note 125, at 52; see Addams, supra note 126, at 72.
128. Max Eastman, What Is Patriotism and What Shall We Do with It?, in TOWARD THE
GREAT CHANGE: CRYSTAL AND MAX EASTMAN ON FEMINISM, ANTIMILITARISM, AND
REVOLUTION, supra note 23, at 239, 246–47; see S.L. FRIEDENBERG, AN APPEAL FOR
INTERNATIONAL UNION 3 (1915).
129. Norman Thomas?, Untitled Partial Typescript (circa Oct. 1916) (on file with the New
York Public Library, Norman Thomas Papers); see Letter from Norman Thomas to Dr. Laidlaw
2 (Mar. 15, 1917) (on file with the New York Public Library, Norman Thomas Papers).
130. Eastman, supra note 128, at 246–47.
131. Id.
132. Letter from Norman Thomas to Members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation 3 (Apr.
23, 1917) (on file with the New York Public Library, Norman Thomas Papers).
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133
socialist and communist critiques of the state. Still others were
latter-day James Madisons, seeing in the relationships among states in
the American federal system a principle that might be extended to
nation-states in a transnational system.134 Some radical
internationalists, like one American conscientious objector in August
1917, claimed simply that “internationalism” was their “only
principle.”135 What this eclectic array of radical internationalisms
agreed upon, however, was that nationalism all too often and all too
easily gave way to militarism, an especially virulent form of
nationalism. Militarism was “the aggressive spirit and unfriendly
point of view toward other nations,” which created “parochial
hostility,” “national aggression,” and a “national psychology of fear,”
all of which led “inevitably . . . to conflict.”136 In its place, Eastman
and the radical internationalists advanced a conception of
cosmopolitan democracy as the “mutual recognition of the rights of
other men, irrespective of creed, color or national boundaries.”137
Their internationalist aim was thus to create transnational institutions
that would contain the threat of militarism by eclipsing the ostensibly
unquestioned authority of nation-states in the orthodox nineteenthcentury view of international law.
Between August 1914 and March 1917, Eastman became perhaps
the leading organizer of the radical internationalist movement in the
United States. By early 1916, she was serving as the executive
secretary of the American Union Against Militarism and as the chair
of the active New York City branch of the Woman’s Peace Party.
Both organizations adopted the positions of the radical
internationalists, opposing the militarism of nation-state rivalries and
supporting a world federation to transcend them. The Peace Party
sought to serve as a worldwide “clearing-house” for internationalist

133. 3,000 Would Rather Die Than Fight, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Sept. 4, 1917, microformed
on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 6, vol. 46; The Psychological Examination of
Conscientious Objectors (circa Dec. 1918) (on file with the New York Public Library, Norman
Thomas Papers).
134. WALTER L. FISHER, PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE, S. DOC. NO. 64-323 (1916).
135. Refuses to Serve in Draft Army, BOSTON ADVERTISER, Aug. 31, 1917, microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 1, vol. 4.
136. Speech by Amos Pinchot, American Union Against Militarism (n.d.), microformed on
Swarthmore College Peace Collection, American Union Against Militarism Papers, Reel 1
(Scholarly Resources, Inc.) [hereinafter AUAM Papers].
137. Id.
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138
ideas during the war. It urged the democratization of foreign policy,
the abrogation of secret treaties, and the nationalization of arms
manufacture to remove commercial incentives to the whipping-up of
nationalist fervor.139 The American Union, in turn, pursued a nearly
identical program to “work against militarism” and to build “toward
world federation, which alone would make disarmament possible, and
which alone could really root out militarism.”140
The American Union developed into America’s most important
radical internationalist organization, with Eastman (in Lillian Wald’s
141
words) as its “wonderful secretary.” Eastman worked to ensure that
all of the “energy and genius” of the American Union would “be
directed toward putting this idea of a world federation into workable
form, acceptable to all nations.”142 As she conceived it, the American
Union’s aim was to “keep the ideal of internationalism alive and
143
growing in the minds and hearts of the American people.” Indeed,
the organization’s international program was lifted almost directly
from the eclectic (and often not altogether consistent) array of ideas
that American and European internationalists had bandied about for
decades: self-determination; equal treatment for all nations; a
“Society of Nations” developed through the Hague Conference; a
“permanent Court of International Justice” to strengthen the existing
Hague Court of Arbitration; reductions in armaments; the voiding of
secret treaties; and the removal of restraints on international trade.
Members of the American Union protested the war’s diversion of
public attention away from “World Peace based on International
Agreement”144 and called for a “democratic federation of American

138. Alice Thacher Post, A Statement on Preparedness, Address Before the Preliminary
Meeting of the Woman’s Peace Party at the Hotel McAlpin, New York (Nov. 19, 1915),
microformed on Columbia University, Lillian D. Wald Papers, Reel 101, Folder 1.1 [hereinafter
Wald Papers].
139. Id.
140. Civil Liberties Bureau, Am. Union Against Militarism, Proposed Announcement for
the Press (circa fall 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
141. Letter from Lillian D. Wald to Amos Pinchot (March 13, 1917), microformed on Wald
Papers, supra note 138, Reel 7, Folder 8.1; see MARCHAND, supra note 86, at 240–43 (describing
Eastman’s role during the American Union’s beginning).
142. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, A Platform of Real Preparedness, in CRYSTAL EASTMAN ON
WOMEN & REVOLUTION, supra note 21, at 241, 246.
143. Am. Union Against Militarism, Statement to the Press (n.d.), microformed on AUAM
Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
144. Am. Union Against Militarism, Statement Concerning the Anti-Militarism Committee
(n.d.), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
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145
They
republics as a step toward international government.”
testified, as Eastman did before Congress in January 1916, against the
creeping militarism that had created a dangerous arms race. And they
urged President Wilson to take up the so-called Hensley Resolution
in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, which authorized him to
convene a Conference of Nations for disarmament. Eastman and her
colleagues advocated policies that they believed would move the
world toward what Eastman described to Congress as
“unnationalism”: a “federation of nations” dedicated to “democracy,
to peace, and to their mutual good will and friendship.”146
Of course, the radical internationalists’ ideas were often utopian
and impractical. But they were no more so than many of the ideas
that had been spinning out of internationalist conversations on both
sides of the Atlantic for decades. Radical internationalism was a
continuation of international lawyers’ esprit d’internationalité. Indeed,
the radicals of 1914 to 1917 drew their inspiration from virtually the
same set of developments that had sent international lawyers into
flights of fantastic rhetoric for the previous half-century. Like
international lawyers since the 1870s, Crystal Eastman’s Woman’s
Peace Party of New York City pointed to the development of the
Universal Postal Union and the International Telegraphic Union and
to the proliferation of international commercial associations such as
the International Congress of Chambers of Commerce. Such
institutions, Eastman and her colleagues contended, were harbingers
of a coming internationalism. The world, it seemed, was growing
smaller. According to orthodox and radical internationalists alike, it
147
was “already in large measure internationalized.” And like Andrew
Carnegie just a few years before, Eastman and her colleagues cited
the international condemnation of slavery in the nineteenth century
as demonstration of the moral progress that international action
could achieve in the newly close quarters of the twentieth.148

145. Am. Union Against Militarism, Development (typescript circa Sept./Oct. 1917),
microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1; Letter from Charles T. Hallinan to
Lillian D. Wald (Jan. 11, 1915 [1916?]), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102,
Folder 2.2; Letter from David Starr Jordan to Lillian D. Wald (Mar. 6, 1917), microformed on
Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 3, Folder 4.5 (enclosure).
146. Hearing on H.R. 6921 and H.J. Res. 32 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
64th Cong. 9–10 (1916) (statement of Commission for Enduring Peace).
147. H.A. Overstreet, The Next Step in International Control, FOUR LIGHTS, Apr. 7, 1917.
148. Id.
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Yet the same questions of nation-state sovereignty and of the
citizen’s obligations to work through official state channels that
divided orthodox internationalists from radicals reappeared within
organizations like the Woman’s Peace Party and the American
Union. In the latter organization, for example, leading members such
as Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg believed strongly in working
through the instrumentalities of the national government to advance
their internationalist aims. Congressional hearings, “personal work
with congressmen,”149 and discrete advocacy with President Wilson
and his Secretary of War Newton Baker were their preferred methods
of action. The American Union therefore pursued a campaign of
private advocacy and personal meetings with Wilson, Baker, and
150
others in the Wilson administration into early 1917.
Eastman, by contrast, represented the radical wing of even the
nation-state skeptics in the internationalist movement. Friendly critics
such as Wald suggested that Eastman was overly enamored of an
151
“impulsive radicalism.” (Members of the Peace Party quietly
152
warned that she was too radical to “greatly help the movement.” )
Eastman’s more confrontational tactics included propaganda
campaigns, national speaking tours, and mass meetings. In the spring
of 1916, she organized a public exhibit that included Jingo the
Dinosaur (“All Armor Plate—No Brains,” announced the collar on
the papier-mâché caricature of militarist nationalism), whose
aggressive personality and tiny brain had led to its own extinction. A
speaking tour through the Midwest followed, reaching an estimated
forty thousand listeners. By May, Eastman had collected the names of
five thousand supporters and distributed over six hundred thousand
“pieces of propaganda.”153 Internationalism, she insisted, was a

149. Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 144.
150. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 34–36; Letter from Lillian D. Wald to Newton Baker (June
20, 1917), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 1, Folder 1.2.; Letter from Lillian
D. Wald to Emily Balch (May 23, 1917), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 1,
Folder 1.3.
151. Letter from Lillian D. Wald to Crystal Eastman (Aug. 26, 1917), microformed on
AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
152. MARCHAND, supra note 86, at 219, 243.
153. CHATFIELD, supra note 87, at 23; Am. Union Against Militarism, Anti-Preparedness
Committee Typescript (n.d.), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
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movement to be pursued by “the people acting directly—not through
154
their governments or diplomats or armies.”
Internationally minded women like Eastman had good reason to
adopt a stance of skepticism toward the official channels of the
nation-state. As woman’s movements across Europe and in the
United States had observed throughout the nineteenth century, states
had long excluded them from full membership. Annis Ford Eastman,
for one, had noted years before that women (and especially married
women) had at best a complicated relationship to the conventional
categories of nation-state citizenship. Nation-states, she observed, had
regularly disabled women from service as soldier, property owner,
voter, officer of the court, or public official.155 Indeed, in 1916, Crystal
Eastman encountered firsthand the liminal status of women in the
modern nation-state when she divorced Bennie and married Walter
Fuller, a British citizen whom she had met through their joint
involvement in the early stages of the American Union. By virtue of a
law enacted by Congress in 1907156 and upheld by the Supreme Court
in the year before Eastman’s marriage,157 American women
automatically took the nationality of their husbands. As a result,
Eastman herself—though still living in the United States—was
stripped of her U.S. citizenship when she married Walter Fuller. It
should hardly be surprising, then, that many women adopted
confrontational tactics—publicity, mass meetings, and direct action by
the people—that skirted the official channels of the state. The state,
after all, had made it exceedingly difficult for women to act through
those official channels. And just as many American women in the
1910s—Eastman included—were being drawn to the radical tactics of
the British suffragettes, so too were they drawn to such tactics in the
internationalist campaign against militarist nationalism.158

154. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (May 29, 1916), microformed on Wald
Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.3; see CHATFIELD, supra note 87, at 23; THOMAS J.
KNOCK, TO END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW WORLD
ORDER 63 (1992); Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 153; Letter from Crystal Eastman
to Lillian D. Wald (May 27, 1916), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102,
Folder 2.3.
155. Annis Ford Eastman, Women’s Relation to Good Citizenship (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 4, Folder 86).
156. An Act in Reference to the Expatriation of Citizens and Their Protection Abroad, ch.
2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (1907) (repealed 1940).
157. MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 301 (1915).
158. CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 45–112 (1998); MARCHAND, supra note 86, at 194–208; Nancy F.
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For Eastman and many other women in internationalist circles,
women’s persistent second-class citizenship highlighted the dangers of
the nation-state and its nationalist symbols. In Four Lights, the
magazine of the Woman’s Peace Party of New York City, Eastman
and her colleagues attacked the nation-state as a kind of artificial
superstition. “Long ago,” wrote one Four Lights author, “we drew
‘imaginary’ lines over our globe . . . we put deep-printed lines over
latitudes and longitudes, believing that lines can separate the nations
of the earth.”159 Over time, those imaginary lines had hardened into
divisions among peoples, “conceiving those across our crooked lines
160
as hostages, enemies, or at best, remote and unlike peoples.” The
“foolish little boundaries” of imaginary maps, however, were now
under attack from a band of “Internationalists” who were “as
disturbing to your nationalistic Flatlander as the witches to Salem.”161
On the internationalist view, Four Lights contended, the “boundary
lines of nations are as imaginary as the equatorial line”; the people on
the other side were “neighbors and friends instead of strangers and
enemies.”162 Indeed, the internationalist agenda, as Eastman and the
Four Lights editors of the Women’s Peace Party of New York City

Cott, Justice for All? Marriage and Deprivation of Citizenship in the United States, in JUSTICE
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 77, 87–89 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1996); Virginia Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and Nationality: Immigration and
Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13 POL. & SOC’Y 1, 10–11 (1984). In 1922, the Cable
Act authorized certain women who lost their citizenship under the 1907 legislation to seek
renaturalization, but there is no evidence that Eastman took advantage of the opportunity. The
Cable Act (which was prompted by women voters newly enfranchised by the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920) did not automatically restore what the 1907 statute had taken away. Act
Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women, ch. 411, § 4, 42 Stat. 1021
(1922). On the relationships between gender and internationalism in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries, see HARRIET HYMAN ALONSO, PEACE AS A WOMEN’S ISSUE: A
HISTORY OF THE U.S. MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
(1993); GAIL BEDERMAN, MANLINESS AND CIVILIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
GENDER AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880–1917 (1995); KRISTIN L. HOGANSON,
FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN MANHOOD: HOW GENDER POLITICS PROVOKED THE SPANISHAMERICAN AND PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WARS (1998); Kristin Hoganson, “As Badly Off as
Filipinos”: U.S. Women’s Suffragists and the Imperial Issue at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,
J. WOMEN’S HIST., Summer 2001, at 9; and Judith Papachristou, American Women and Foreign
Policy: 1898–1905, 14 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 493 (1990).
159. Edna Kenton, Bounded on the North, South, East, and West, FOUR LIGHTS,
Jan. 27, 1917.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
AND INJUSTICE IN
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conceived it, was no less than “to destroy geography” by “welding the
163
nations of the world into the United States of the World.”
What women-led antiwar organizations had done was to sharpen
two decades’ worth of growing skepticism about a nineteenth-century
abstraction. But it was not skepticism about the abstraction of rights.
It was instead skepticism about that other great nineteenth-century
legal abstraction: the sovereignty of nation-states, which in
internationalist circles had already come to seem little more than an
abstract “relic from an earlier era,” as international lawyer Louis
Henkin would later describe it, made up of “fictions upon fictions.”164
Here was one of the most dangerous of “a priori truths,” in Addams’s
words, a fiction that inspired “violent loyalty” and caused “men in a
nation, an army, a crowd” to do things “horrible as well as heroic that
165
they could never do alone.” The nation had become a kind of
“metaphysical entity,” complained Norman Thomas, “apart from the
individuals who compose it.”166 Rights might have been a nineteenthcentury idea newly vulnerable in an era of war and pragmatism, but
so too was the sovereignty of states. As Germany resumed
unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917, conditions in the
United States were right for a collision between the obligations of
loyalty exacted by the nation-state, on one hand, and internationalist
ideals of cosmopolitan citizenship, on the other. That collision would
initiate the twentieth-century civil liberties movement.
III. INTERNATIONALISM AND THE
BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN “CIVIL LIBERTIES”
It was one thing to question the form of the nation-state in 1916,
to describe it as a dangerous legal fiction, and to call for its eclipse by

163. To George Washington and Patrick Henry: Greetings!, FOUR LIGHTS, Mar. 10, 1917.
Eastman and the Woman’s Peace Party were not completely utopian on this point. “[T]here will
still be numerous independent sovereign nations” after the war was finished, they conceded, but
at the very least the war’s end could bring into being international structures to mediate the
militarist rivalries that had brought on the war. A. D., Friendly Relations Commissions, FOUR
LIGHTS, Apr. 7, 1917.
164. LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8–10 (1995); see also
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
165. Addams, supra note 126, at 73–74.
166. Letter from Norman Thomas to Alfred T. Carton (Sept. 7, 1917) (on file with the New
York Public Library, Norman Thomas Papers). For the point that claims of national attachment
and obligation should be treated as skeptically as claims of natural individual rights, see Jeremy
Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751,
781 (1992).
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new systems of international governance. But once the United States
entered the war in April 1917, questions about citizens’ obligations to
the state were no longer merely theoretical. Among U.S.
internationalists, intervention in the war thus touched off a scramble
for a secure position between loyalty and internationalism. “After
war was declared, we of course ceased all opposition to it,” explained
167
one member of the American Union. At the Woman’s Peace Party,
the reaction was the same: “All the activities of the Woman’s Peace
Party have been, of course, modified by the entrance . . . into the
World War.”168 And as far as Crystal Eastman’s long-time friend Paul
Kellogg was concerned, he favored “not blocking the prosecution of
war, now that the decision has been made.”169 For many, the loyalty
obligations of the nation-state thus seemed to trump the
internationalist agenda. In the words of Elihu Root, “the question of
peace or war” had “now been decided by the President and
170
congress.” “The question no longer remains open,” Root concluded,
and it had become the duty of American citizens “to stop discussion
upon the question decided” lest criticism weaken the power of the
nation to “succeed in the war upon which” it had entered.171 As
William R. Vance, dean of the University of Minnesota Law School,
summed up in 1917, “[W]artime was no time to quibble about
constitutional rights and guarantees.”172 Indeed, the mere
“suggestion” of opposition to conscription—a position that had
formed one of the American Union’s deepest commitments—now
seemed to many Americans no different than “treason,” and its
advocates “traitors” to “be dealt with accordingly.”173
167. Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 145.
168. ADDAMS, supra note 125, at 107.
169. Crystal Eastman, Typescript (June 14, 1917), microformed on AUAM papers, supra
note 136, Reel 1.
170. Elihu Root, Address in Chicago 3 (Sept. 14, 1917) (Nat’l Security League, Patriotism
Through Education Series No. 17, 1917).
171. Id. at 3, 5; see Elihu Root, Foreign Affairs, 1913–1916 (Feb. 15, 1916), reprinted in
ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS BY ELIHU ROOT, supra note 118, at 427, 427–28.
172. H.C. PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR, 1917–1918, at 79 (1957).
173. They Who Play with Fire, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May 31, 1917, microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4, vol. 29; see also Christian Pacifists Are Given Cold
Shoulder, LONG BEACH TELEGRAM, Sept. 7, 1917, microformed on ACLU Archives, supra
note 11, Reel 4, vol. 29; Speaking of Conscientious Objectors, ARMY & NAVY NEWS, Sept. 6,
1917, microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 6, vol. 47. On the culture of
obligation in World War I America, see Christopher Joseph Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You:
Political Obligations in World War I America 284–351 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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Whether the American Union would be able to identify an
intermediate position between loyalty and internationalism seemed to
turn in large part on the Wilson administration’s wartime stance
toward the radical internationalists. As a rhetorical matter, at least,
Wilson often allied himself with radical internationalists such as
Addams and Eastman. As far back as the 1880s, Wilson had
tentatively endorsed the idea that the world was witnessing a gradual
evolution toward “confederation” among states on the model of the
United States. He taught international law at Princeton in 1892. In
174
1908 he joined the American Peace Society. And once war broke
out in 1914, he appealed to Americans to remain “neutral in fact as
well as in name,” while privately endorsing the idea of “an association
of nations” and opening a dialogue with peace organizations such as
the Carnegie Endowment and the League to Enforce Peace.175 In
1916, Wilson privately assured a delegation from the American Union
that he was working toward a “joint effort” on a global scale to “keep
the peace”; two months later, he came out publicly in favor of the
principle of a “League of Peace” by which the “nations of the world”
would “band themselves together to see that . . . right prevails.”176 In
his famous “Fourteen Points” speech to the Senate in January 1917,
he called again for an international “concert of power which will
make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever
overwhelm us again.”177
In these respects, at least, Wilson’s vision for a postwar order
often looked remarkably like that of internationalists in the American
Union. To allow nationalistic ambitions to shape the peace, Wilson
seemed to believe, would merely ensure the resurgence of the
national rivalries that had caused it in the first place. Instead, Wilson
urged a peace based on the “equality of rights” among nations, “free
access” for all nations to the seas and to international commerce, and
the “limitation of armies” and of “military preparation.”178 Moreover,
many of his public addresses seemed (like Eastman’s antimilitarist

174. HARLEY NOTTER, THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WOODROW WILSON 264
(1937).
175. JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., THE WARRIOR AND THE PRIEST: WOODROW WILSON
AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT 273, 275 (1983); see RUHL J. BARTLETT, THE LEAGUE TO
ENFORCE PEACE 34 (1944).
176. 37 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 115 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1981); see 36 id. at 645
(1981).
177. 40 id. at 534 (1982).
178. 36 id. at 645 (1981).
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tactics) to skirt the official channels of nation-state diplomacy. Wilson
spoke eloquently of reaching “the peoples of Europe over the heads
179
of their Rulers”; as he told one correspondent, his “Peace Without
Victory” speech was addressed not to the Senate, nor even to
“foreign governments,” but to “the people of the countries now at
war.”180 Wilson, in short, seemed to have embraced the hopeful
idealism of the prewar internationalist spirit. Leaders of the
American Union and the Woman’s Peace Party thus saw in Wilson’s
bold internationalist rhetoric of 1916 and 1917 their own aspirations
for postwar international order. Even as late as the beginning of 1918,
for example, Crystal Eastman and her brother Max supported the
president, endorsing “his demand for an international union, based
upon free seas, free commerce and general disarmament.”181
In practice, however, Wilson proved to be an ardent believer in
Root’s orthodox approach to the relationship between states and
individuals in the law of nations. Wilson claimed that the United
States had entered the war to pursue the “vindication of right, of
182
human right,” and the “rights of mankind.” But those rights were to
be advanced on the international stage by vindicating the rights not of
individuals but of sovereign nation-states. “We shall be satisfied,”
Wilson told the assembled joint session of Congress, when human
rights “have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of
nations can make them.”183 In the final analysis, Wilson’s
internationalism aimed to ensure the “rights and liberties” of “nations
great and small,” and in particular “the most sacred rights of our
nation.”184 His “concert of free peoples” was just that—an association
of peoples organized in nation-states for the purpose of bringing
185
“peace and safety to all nations.” And when the war came to the
United States, Wilson became a powerful (if occasionally reluctant)
believer in the overriding power of citizens’ obligations of loyalty to
the state. War, he warned Frank Cobb of the New York World in

179. KNOCK, supra note 154, at 162; see Laurence W. Martin, Woodrow Wilson’s Appeals to
the People of Europe, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 498, 499 (1959).
180. 41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 176, at 55; see KNOCK, supra note
154, at 114–15.
181. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, Editorial, in CRYSTAL EASTMAN ON WOMEN & REVOLUTION,
supra note 21, at 291; see KNOCK, supra note 154, at 11–12.
182. 41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 176, at 520–26 (1983).
183. 41 id. at 525 (emphasis added).
184. 41 id. at 521 (emphases added).
185. 41 id. at 527 (emphasis added).
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March 1917, would require “illiberalism at home to reinforce the men
186
at the front.” “The Constitution,” Wilson continued, “would not
survive” a war, and “free speech and the right of assembly would go,”
187
too. By May 1917, merely a month after American entry into the
war, Wilson had already begun to shut down the conversations that
he had helped to start about the shape of postwar internationalism.
Such conversations, he warned, were “very unwise” while the war was
still pending.188
With the Wilson administration’s approval and encouragement,
state and federal governments alike enacted new legislation to
enforce the loyalty to the nation required of citizens. In February
1917, Congress had debated legislation to punish those who
intentionally caused disaffection in the armed forces or who
intentionally interfered in military operations.189 With the declaration
of war on April 6, such legislation became a virtual certainty.
Congress authorized selective conscription, which Wilson put into
effect by requiring the registration of all men between the ages of
twenty-one and thirty.190 The Espionage Act, enacted June 15,
authorized criminal prosecution of spies and of anyone who
obstructed recruitment or enlistment or who caused or attempted to
cause insubordination or disloyalty in military or naval forces.191
Materials violating the Espionage Act or otherwise “urging treason”
were “declared to be nonmailable matter” not to be delivered by the
postmaster general.192 The Trading with the Enemy Act limited
commerce and communication with enemies of the United States.193
Amendments to the Espionage Act in May 1918 prohibited disloyal
or abusive language about “the form of government of the United
States,” or about its flag, uniforms, or military or naval forces.194 From

186. Arthur S. Link, That Cobb Interview, 72 J. AM. HIST. 7, 11–12 (1985).
187. Id.
188. COOPER, supra note 175, at 330.
189. To Punish Espionage and Interference with Neutrality: Hearings on S. 8148 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Congress (1917); Am. Union Against Militarism, Bulletins
(Feb. 1917), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 101, Folder 1.1.
190. An Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military
Establishment, 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
191. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–
799 (2000)).
192. Id. tit. XII, § 2, 40 Stat. at 230.
193. 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 1–44 (2000)).
194. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799
(2000)).
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Montana and Texas to Minnesota and Nebraska, similar
developments produced dozens of new laws at the state and
195
municipal levels banning expressions of opposition to the war.
Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson and Attorney General
Thomas Gregory enforced the new legislation with an enthusiastic
abandon that the New York World called “an intellectual reign of
terror in the United States.”196 “May God have mercy” on dissenters
from the nation’s war plans, thundered Gregory, “for they need
expect none from an outraged people and an avenging
government.”197 Between 1917 and the end of 1921, the federal
government would commence more than two thousand prosecutions
under the Espionage Act. Burleson shut down dozens of foreign
language newspapers pursuant to authority granted him under the
Trading with the Enemy Act. Newspapers such as the conservative
socialist Milwaukee Leader were denied mailing privileges, as were
seventy-four other newspapers by the fall of 1918. Even the eminently
respectable Nation was barred from the mails on Burleson’s order
until Wilson intervened.198 The August 1917 issue of Max Eastman’s
avant-garde journal the Masses was declared nonmailable by
Burleson and Gregory for its antiwar cartoons and its opposition to
the draft. After an order by U.S. District Judge Learned Hand
requiring Burleson to mail the issue was stayed and overturned by the
Court of Appeals, Burleson revoked the Masses’ second-class mailing
privileges altogether for having missed an issue and thus having failed
to remain a “periodical” within the meaning of the second-class mail
law.199
Private and quasi-private patriotism was often as powerful a
force as the authority of the state. Ad hoc vigilante gangs and
ultranationalist patriots—organizations like the American Defense

195.

ELDRIDGE FOSTER DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LEGISLATION
UNITED STATES 147 (1939); PETERSON & FITE, supra note 172, at 18, 213–14. See
generally William Henry Thomas, Jr., The United States Department of Justice and Dissent
During the First World War (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa)
(describing the Justice Department’s covert campaign to suppress opposition to the war effort)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
196. MURPHY, supra note 9, at 98.
197. PETERSON & FITE, supra note 172, at 115; MURPHY, supra note 9, at 95.
198. HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1917–
1921, at 30, 63 (1960).
199. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); MAX EASTMAN, LOVE
AND REVOLUTION: MY JOURNEY THROUGH AN EPOCH 61 (1964).
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Society, the American Protective League, the National Liberty
League, the Liberty League, the Knights of Liberty, the American
Rights League, and the Boy Spies of America—smashed antiwar
demonstrations, interrupted pacifist speaking halls, and lynched men
200
suspected of pro-German leanings. The more respectable National
Security League held events urging national loyalty and condemning
those whom former President Theodore Roosevelt called “weaklings,
illusionists, materialists, lukewarm Americans and faddists of all the
201
types that vitiate sound nationalism.” National Security League
addresses were supplemented by the thousands of speakers (“Four
Minute Men,” as they were known) who operated out of the federal
government’s Committee on Public Information (CPI). Headed by
former journalist George Creel, the CPI spearheaded a massive
propaganda campaign in the form of an extraordinary seventy-five
million pamphlets and as many as six thousand press releases,
virtually all broadcasting the importance of national loyalty in time of
war.202 As one Security League speaker summed up the message of
the patriotic campaign of 1917, the nationalist view was that
203
“citizenship means everything or nothing.” Loyal citizens “should
refrain from fractious criticism,” speakers cautioned, and should
openly display their support for the war effort lest they be mistaken
for “unconditional traitors” who hid treasonous attitudes beneath an
outward display of silence.204 In the new wartime atmosphere, those
whom Roosevelt and his nationalist allies scorned as “professional
205
internationalists” were most at risk. Treasury Secretary William
McAdoo declared in October 1917 that advocacy of internationalism
206
during wartime was, “in effect, traitorous.” Others expressed the

200. PETERSON & FITE, supra note 172, at 18; Geo. H. Greenfield, Democracy’s Battle 6
(n.d.), microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4; National Civil Liberties Bureau,
Press Statement (July 1917), microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4. On the
work of private associations enforcing political obligations during the war, see Capozzola, supra
note 173, at 26–81.
201. COOPER, supra note 175, at 331.
202. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 61–66.
203. Henry Litchfield West & Charles T. Hallinan, Debate on University Military Training
as a Permanent Principle of National Defense 3 (1918) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see
ALFRED M. BROOKS, CONVERTED AND SECRET AMERICANS 5 (Nat’l Security League,
Patriotism Through Education Series No. 30, 1918).
204. S. STANWOOD MENKEN, A CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SERVICE 2 (Nat’l Security League,
Patriotism Through Education Series No. 27, 1918).
205. KNOCK, supra note 154, at 169.
206. PETERSON & FITE, supra note 172, at 148–49.
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same sentiment in less civilized fashion, scrawling slogans like
“Treason’s Twilight Zone” on the doors to the American Union’s
207
offices.
For Crystal Eastman and her American Union colleagues, the
wartime atmosphere of mandatory loyalty to the nation-state made it
extraordinarily important to determine “the logical, courageous, and
at the same time law abiding” role for internationalists.208 “Extreme
patriots would force us to go out of business,” she observed, yet
“extremists of another sort” would surely put them all “in the federal
penitentiary.”209 Many items on the American Union’s prewar agenda
were now “impracticable,” opposition to the war not the least among
210
them. As the spring of 1917 wore on, however, a new role seemed
increasingly available. President Wilson had “turned his back on civil
liberties,” as historian John Blum has argued, “because he loved his
vision of eventual peace more.”211 But if Eastman’s wing of American
internationalism was right about the drift toward militarist
nationalism, nongovernmental organizations like the American
Union would have to be able to articulate views other than those
approved by the state. The very conversation about postwar
internationalism that Wilson had started would have to be continued,
whether Wilson approved of it or not. Yet if radical antimilitarists
were to carry on their advocacy of a new internationalism to replace
the nation-state, they would have to establish some kind of protection
from the very authority they sought to displace.
In the spring of 1917, civil liberties emerged as the solution to the
dilemma of the internationalists in wartime. Civil liberties provided
the position between jingoist patriotism and treasonous
internationalism for which the American Union had been searching.
As American Union member John Haynes Holmes would later
remember, American entry into the war meant that disarmament and
attendant internationalist goals were, “for the time being at least,” a
“lost cause.” “But lo,” he continued, “as though to engage our liberal
efforts afresh, there came suddenly to the fore in our nation’s life the

207. CHATFIELD, supra note 87, at 4.
208. Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 145.
209. Id.
210. Am. Union Against Militarism, Memorandum of Organization 2 (circa Apr. 1917) (on
file with the New York Public Library, Norman Thomas Papers).
211. JOHN MORTON BLUM, WOODROW WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF MORALITY 144
(1956).
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212
new issue of civil liberties.” Already in April 1917, the American
Union called for an “immediate anti-conscription campaign” and
“cooperation in the defense of free speech and free assembly during
the war.”213 Americans might no longer safely argue against the war
effort, but they could surely work “to prevent and oppose all those
extreme manifestations of militarism” that seemed certain to follow in
war’s wake: “the brutal treatment” of the conscientious objector, “the
denial of free speech,” and “the suppressing of minority press.”214 The
resolution of the internationalists’ crisis, in short, was to fight “the
general abrogation of civil liberty” that the war among nation-states
had brought in its wake.215 Indeed, such work, American Union
leaders argued, was “the logical consequence of what we have been
216
As Eastman urged, the defense of
doing for two years.”
conscientious objectors and the protection of civil liberties had a
217
“natural and logical place in the progress of our activities.” The
American Union, in her view, was the “logical group to defend the
other American liberties, free speech, free press and free assembly.”218
As the organization put it in a press release in the fall of 1917, a
“Union Against Militarism becomes, during war time, inevitably a
Union for the Defense of Civil Liberty.”219 In late June 1917, the
Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau of the American Union, which had
tentatively been formed two months earlier, was remade into the
“Civil Liberties Bureau.”220 Within weeks, “civil liberties” had
become the “chief war work” of the nation’s leading radicalinternationalist organization.221

212. JOHN HAYNES HOLMES, I SPEAK FOR MYSELF: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
HAYNES HOLMES 189 (1959).
213. Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 210, at 2.
214. Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 145.
215. Id.
216. Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes of the Meeting (June 4, 1917), microformed on
AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
217. Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes of the Meeting (June 15, 1917), microformed
on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
218. Id.
219. Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 140.
220. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (June 18, 1917), microformed on Wald
Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.4; Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 216;
Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting (June 25, 1917),
microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
221. Proposed Announcement for the Press, AUAM Papers, supra note 136, reel 1.
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The name of the new Civil Liberties Bureau emerged out of the
same transatlantic internationalism from which the American Union
had arisen. Though the term “civil liberty” had long been central to
Anglo-American law and political theory, eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century lawyers and political writers only sparingly and
erratically employed its disaggregated form, the plural “civil
liberties.” The phrase had been popularized just a year earlier by the
222
Walter Fuller,
British National Council for Civil Liberties.
Eastman’s new husband, was closely connected to the British
organization (he would later become its corresponding secretary).
With the establishment of the Civil Liberties Bureau, the American
Union adopted the National Council’s coinage as its own. Roger
Baldwin, the recent addition to the American Union staff who
headed-up the new Civil Liberties Bureau, would later recall that the
Bureau’s name represented “the first time that the phrase ‘civil
liberties’ had been so used in the United States.”223
The phrase seemed well-tailored for inveterate rights-skeptics
such as Eastman. The term “civil liberties” promised to break down
the abstraction of “civil liberty” into its specific and concrete
component parts – “free speech, free press and free assembly,” as
Eastman put it. Indeed, the phrase accomplished for the American
Union what influential legal theorists of the same generation sought
to do for legal thought. Early legal realists such as Yale Law School’s
Wesley Hohfeld argued that nineteenth-century juristic abstractions
such as “liberty” had contributed to dangerously sloppy modes of
legal reasoning. Legal slogans such as “right,” “property,” and
“liberty,” Hohfeld insisted, contained a multitude of discrete legal
relations. Those relations, in turn, were best understood in
disaggregated terms, not in the language of conceptual deduction and
224
abstract principle. By the same token, disaggregated “civil liberties”
claims seemed well-designed to mediate the tensions that rightsclaims posed for those in radical internationalist circles who had been
critical of rights-based thinking only a few short years before. Civil

222. MURPHY, supra note 9, at 9; see also MARVIN SWARTZ, THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC
CONTROL IN BRITISH POLITICS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 51 (1971).
223. MURPHY, supra note 9, at 9.
224. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Joseph William Singer,
The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Betham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L.
REV. 975, 1057–58.
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liberties would be “civil liberty” for a Hohfeldian age of pragmatic
skepticism about legal abstractions.
Most importantly, for Eastman the civil liberties initiative
represented not a new set of rights-based ends, but rather a
continuation by other means of the American Union’s pre-war
internationalist agenda. Now that war had materialized, the defense
of civil liberties seemed a necessary precondition to the advancement
of internationalism. Norman Thomas argued that “the country which
[suppresses civil liberties] will never commend democracy to the
world.”225 Eastman further contended that all nations needed to “be
226
democratized before a federated world can be achieved.” At the
very least, it seemed clear, as a small but growing number of people
ranging from the members of the Woman’s Peace Party of New York
City to Senator Joseph I. France of Maryland noted, that “full free
and continuous discussion” of matters of great public import—the
nation’s war aims, peace terms, and treaty negotiations—required
“freedom of the press” and “freedom of speech.”227
Early efforts in the Civil Liberties Bureau thus adopted civil
228
liberties as a strategic tool for the advancement of internationalism.
The Bureau’s earliest efforts were often not authentic expressions of
a commitment to the virtues of the Bill of Rights, but means to
internationalist ends. Roger Baldwin of the American Union put it
most cynically when he instructed a colleague “to get a good lot of
flags” and “talk a good deal about the Constitution.”229 Baldwin’s

225. Letter from Norman Thomas to Roger Nash Baldwin (Sept. 7, 1917), microformed on
AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 4.
226. Cook, supra note 21, at 20. On the political theory of democracy and international
peace, see Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (pts. 1 & 2), 12 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 205, 323 (1983).
227. Woman’s Peace Party of New York City, Our War Record: A Plea for Tolerance 128,
128, in THE EAGLE AND THE DOVE: THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY, 1900–1922, supra note 109, at 128; see Am. Union Against Militarism, Seven
Congressmen on Preparedness, microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1; Am.
Union Against Militarism, A Challenge Accepted (n.d.), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra
note 136, Reel 1; National Civil Liberties Bureau, Handbill: Who Has Been Imprisoned Under
the Espionage Act?, microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 15, Folder 14.
228. Bureau insiders, for example, sought to get the government to distinguish between
IWW members and other labor radicals, on one hand, and the “fine type” of conscientious
objector who could be found in the nation’s universities, on the other, at least in part because
the Bureau had invested its hopes for American internationalism in the latter group. See Oswald
G. Villard, Typescript (n.d.), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.4.
229. 1 J. LEGIS. COMM. IN THE S. OF THE ST. OF N.Y., REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM: ITS
HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND TACTICS 1088 (1920).
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instrumentalism was perhaps more cynical than most. But his
strategic appropriation of constitutional rights as symbols of
American nationalism captured the spirit of the organization’s turn to
civil liberties in 1917. The American Union had advocated
international institutions for years precisely because those institutions
seemed better able than nation-states to secure human freedom and
democracy. In 1917 the organization’s members found themselves
compelled by the circumstances of the war to make those claims in
new “civil liberties” terms, but the aims remained the same.
During the summer and fall of 1917, Eastman worked alongside
Roger Baldwin in the American Union’s civil liberties activities. As
Baldwin would later recall, Eastman had been his “first associate in
World War I days.”230 Together, they defended conscientious
objectors and antiwar agitators. Eastman even developed an
ambitious plan of test cases to try the “actual testing of the right of
free speech” in those places in which it had been limited.231 And yet
Baldwin emerged as the leader of the Civil Liberties Bureau. It was a
development that had significant implications for the internationalist
agenda and the fledgling civil liberties movement.
IV. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ECLIPSE OF INTERNATIONALISM
Eastman had missed the beginnings of the American Union’s
wartime move to civil liberties. On March 19, 1917, she gave birth to
her first child, Jeffrey Fuller. The birth appears to have had lasting
effects on Eastman’s health. She had always been susceptible to
sickness. When Eastman was three, she and her older brother Morgan
contracted scarlet fever. Morgan died, and though Crystal survived,
she regularly suffered debilitating illnesses thereafter.232 In 1911, she
was forced to break off her engagement with the New York state
233
employers’ liability commission because of illness. In April 1916,
she became ill during the American Union’s Truth About
Preparedness Tour, and was ordered “kept strictly in bed” for several

230. The Reminiscences of Roger Nash Baldwin 158 (1961) (on file with Columbia
University, Oral History Research Office).
231. Am. Union Against Militarism, Secretary’s Recommendations (circa fall 1917),
microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 136, Reel 1.
232. EASTMAN, supra note 19, at 45–49.
233. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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234
weeks. With Jeffrey’s birth, Eastman developed a “chronic disease
of her kidneys,” as Max later described it, that would plague her until
235
her death. By March 1921, she would be forced to resign from the
executive committee of the Civil Liberties Bureau’s successor, the
American Civil Liberties Union. “I have always been too tired,”
explained the otherwise energetic Eastman.236 She would die just
seven years later, in 1928.
Eastman’s complicated pregnancy forced her to take off more
than two months beginning in mid-March 1917. They were a critical
two months, spanning the beginning of American involvement in the
war, and Eastman knew it. “I am crazy to get back on the job,” she
237
wrote shortly after Jeffrey’s birth. There would be, she feared,
“nothing left for me to do” by the time she got back.238 Most
troublingly, Eastman feared that in her absence the American Union
would turn away from its radical-internationalist agenda. Baldwin, in
particular, had suggested a new direction for the group that Eastman
239
found wanting “in a great many respects.” She had hoped to meet
with Baldwin before giving birth to Jeffrey and going to Atlantic City
to convalesce, but Walter and her physician insisted that she not.240
During Eastman’s absence, which continued into early June
1917, Baldwin had indeed begun to establish himself as the new force
in the American Union. His extraordinary energies matched
Eastman’s. Like Eastman, he had begun his career as a sociologically
informed architect of the modern administrative state. After
graduation from Harvard College, he had gone to St. Louis to found
the sociology department of Washington University and to run a
neighborhood settlement house. While in St. Louis, Baldwin also
became actively involved in the reform of the city’s criminal courts.

234. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (Apr. 11, 1916), microformed on Wald
Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.3.
235. Letter from Max Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (n.d.), microformed on Wald Papers,
supra note 138, Reel 3, Folder 4.2.
236. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Roger Nash Baldwin (Mar. 23, 1921), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 24, vol. 68.
237. MARCHAND, supra note 86, at 255 n.80.
238. Id.
239. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (n.d.), microformed on Wald Papers,
supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.3; see also Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald
(circa Apr. 1917), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.4.
240. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (n.d.), microformed on Wald Papers,
supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.4; Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (Apr. 11
[1917?]) microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.3.
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What workmen’s compensation had been to Eastman, the new
juvenile courts and probation systems were to Baldwin: socialized
systems for modernizing nineteenth-century law. Like workmen’s
compensation programs, juvenile courts aimed to replace
cumbersome inquiries into individual rights and moral culpability
with regimes of social-scientific expertise designed to treat social
241
Expert “professional
problems and manage populations.
standards,” in Baldwin’s words, would replace traditional
adjudication, which Baldwin had come to think of as simply “judicial
interference.”242 While Eastman was counting injured workers in
Pittsburgh, Baldwin helped to found the National Probation Officers’
Association. A few years later, he coauthored what would quickly
become a leading text in the field of juvenile justice.243
Despite their similar backgrounds in progressive-era sociological
reform, Baldwin and Eastman quickly developed an “uneasy”
244
relationship to one another. For one thing, Baldwin’s Harvard
education and inside connections in the Wilson administration made
him both more inclined and better positioned than Eastman to
engage in the kind of discreet advocacy with government officials that
colleagues like Lillian Wald favored. Moreover, Baldwin came to the
work of the American Union with an essentially domestic outlook.
While Eastman toured Europe, met with international woman’s
suffrage leaders, and encountered European radicals in the
cosmopolitan setting of New York City, Baldwin had gone to the
relatively insular St. Louis. His frame of reference in the area of civil
liberties was therefore not, as Eastman’s had been, the
internationalist outlook of the woman’s suffrage movement. Instead,
Baldwin had developed the outlook of a domestic reformer, involved
in such fights as the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People’s efforts to fight municipal housing segregation.245 To
be sure, in his first months with the American Union, Baldwin
supported its core internationalist agenda. And much later in life,
Baldwin would become deeply involved in the United Nations’s work
241. See DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING (2004); WILLRICH,
supra note 15.
242. The Reminiscences of Roger Nash Baldwin, supra note 230, at 27.
243. BERNARD FLEXNER & ROGER N. BALDWIN, JUVENILE COURTS AND PROBATION
(1914).
244. The Reminiscences of Roger Nash Baldwin, supra note 230, at 55.
245. ROBERT C. COTTRELL, ROGER NASH BALDWIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION 1–60 (2000).
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for international human rights. “Nations,” he would suggest in the
1970s, were “downright silly.” As Eastman had suggested sixty years
earlier, Baldwin would contend that national boundaries were
imaginary divisions of people into “geographical units” bounded by
246
arbitrary lines and protected by armies. But in 1917, as Eastman had
already begun to realize, Baldwin’s arrival served to exacerbate
increasingly acute differences within the American Union over the
question of internationalism.
For a few months, tensions between Baldwin’s and Eastman’s
theories of civil liberties took a back seat to a larger conflict that
drove such figures as Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg out of the
American Union altogether. Wald and Kellogg had never been
convinced that the civil liberties strategy offered a viable solution to
the American Union’s wartime dilemmas. After the declaration of
war, Wald and Kellogg—like Root and Wilson—believed strongly
that the obligations of national citizenship required support for the
war effort. The civil liberties campaign engineered by Baldwin and
Eastman, in their view, veered too close to making the American
Union “a party of opposition to the government.”247 Over the course
of the summer, Wald and Kellogg struggled to bring the American
Union around to Wald’s less confrontational approach. By
September, however, Wald, Kellogg, and a number of others felt that
they could not “remain if the active work for Civil Liberties is
continued.”248 Eastman and others in the American Union insisted
that the organization was not “embarking on a program of political
249
obstruction” and merely working “against hysterical legislation, and

246. PEGGY LAMSON, ROGER BALDWIN: FOUNDER OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION 278 (1976). Even in the 1920s, Baldwin would become involved in international causes
such as opposition to imperialism in India and elsewhere. Baldwin usually approached these
international causes outside of his official capacity as the leader of U.S. civil liberties
organizations like the ACLU. Moreover, by the early 1920s (and for much of the rest of his life)
his international interests were thoroughly caught up in the early Cold War contests between
the Soviet Union and the United States, contests in which Baldwin sympathized with the Soviets
until his switch to vigorous anticommunism by the end of the 1930s. See COTTRELL, supra note
245, at 169–98, 262–63.
247. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Emily Balch (June 14, 1917), in TOWARD THE GREAT
CHANGE: CRYSTAL AND MAX EASTMAN ON FEMINISM, ANTIMILITARISM, AND REVOLUTION,
supra note 23, at 271, 271.
248. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Lillian D. Wald (Sept. 25, 1917), microformed on Wald
Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.4.
249. Letter from Norman Thomas to Lillian D. Wald (Aug. 27, 1917) (on file with the New
York Public Library, Norman Thomas Papers).
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250
for peace.” But the subtleties of the distinction were lost on the
disgruntled Wald-Kellogg wing of the American Union. By October
1917, Wald and Kellogg had resigned.251
Divergences between Baldwin and Eastman quickly resurfaced
once the split within the American Union was complete. By the fall of
1917, the prevailing atmosphere of mandatory patriotism made it
virtually impossible for the Civil Liberties Bureau to advance
Eastman’s brand of internationalism. After complaints from highranking members of the military, Secretary of War Newton Baker cut
off contact between the War Department and the Bureau in May
1918. Three months later, the Department of Justice raided the
Bureau’s offices and seized its papers.252 Courts began convening
grand juries to investigate “foreigners” on soap boxes.253 Max
Eastman was put on trial not once but twice during 1918 for his work
254
on the Masses (the juries deadlocked both times). Baldwin himself
was arrested for refusing to register for the draft, convicted, and
sentenced to one year in prison.255
Around the country, attitudes toward internationalists
deteriorated still further. Herbert Bigelow, who had spoken on behalf
of the American Union’s Truth About Preparedness Campaign in the
spring of 1916, was kidnapped and brutalized in November 1917.256
The Grand Rapids Press labeled the American Union and allied
257
groups “seditious,” and the New York Tribune classed them as
dangerous “enemies within.”258 By August 1918, Theodore Roosevelt
was singling out “internationalists” as playing into the hands of

250. Letter to Mr. Evans (Mar. 20, 1917) (on file with the New York Public Library,
Norman Thomas Papers).
251. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 35–36; Letter from Catherine Crystal Eastman to Lillian D.
Wald (Sept. 25, 1917), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.4; see
also Letter from Lillian D. Wald to Roger N. Baldwin (Oct. 12, 1917) microformed on Wald
Papers, supra note 138, Reel 1, Folder 1.8.
252. The Reminiscences of Roger Nash Baldwin, supra note 230, at 60–61.
253. Urges Indictments for Seditious Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1917, at 4.
254. EASTMAN, supra note 199, at 92–99, 118–24.
255. COTTRELL, supra note 245, at 83–90.
256. Telegram from E.F. Alexander to Roger N. Baldwin (Nov. 1, 1917), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4; Press Release, National Civil Liberties Bureau (Nov. 7,
1917), microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4.
257. They Who Play with Fire, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May 1917, microformed on ACLU
Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4.
258. Statement to the New York Tribune by the Civil Liberties Bureau of the American
Union Against Militarism (Sept. 27, 1917), microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel
102, Folder 2.4.
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259
“German autocracy.” “Internationalism,” Elihu Root would soon
announce, had become a threat to “the authority and responsibility of
260
nations,” including the United States.
In the face of nationalist coercion, Baldwin led the Civil Liberties
Bureau—now formally divorced from the American Union and
renamed the National Civil Liberties Bureau—in what Norman
261
Thomas called a “new direction” for civil liberties. The moral
imperatives of nationalism had recast internationalism as treason.
“[I]nternationalists and radical peace organizations,” explained
Roger Baldwin to one supporter in September 1917, had come under
tremendous pressure to purge “German names” from their lists of
officials.262 Things became all the more dire after the November 1917
Bolshevik revolution in Russia. “Worldwide Anarchist Plot”
screamed headlines linking the “Bolsheviki” to the IWW and to
“revolutionists” around the world.263 As the prosecutor at the 1918
Espionage Act trial of Eugene Debs said in his closing argument to
the jury, “Pitch all the nations into one pot with the Socialists on top
and you’ve got internationalism.”264 By 1919, the federal government
initiated deportations of suspected radicals back to Russia. The
infamous Palmer Raids on suspected radicals quickly followed
beginning in November of that year, as did the similar Lusk
Committee Raids in New York State after them.265 By December
1919, President Wilson, who had been a willing but unenthusiastic
supporter of Burleson’s and Gregory’s enforcement actions during
the war, was calling for a peacetime extension of the Espionage Act.266
Even Lillian Wald, who had so carefully extricated herself in the
summer of 1917 from the possible appearance of opposition to the

259.

Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (Aug. 26, 1918), in THE EAGLE
DOVE: THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY,
1900–1922, supra note 109, at 127, 127; see KNOCK, supra note 154, at 169.
260. Elihu Root, The Conditions and Possibilities Remaining for International Law After
the War (April 27, 1921), reprinted in MEN AND POLICIES: ADDRESSES BY ELIHU ROOT 427,
432 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1925).
261. Letter from Norman Thomas et al. to Lillian D. Wald (Jan. 19, 1920), microformed on
Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 10, Folder 12.4.
262. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Lawrence G. Brooks (Sept. 24, 1917), microformed
on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4.
263. See Worldwide Anarchist Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1917, at 1.
264. PETERSON & FITE, supra note 172, at 253.
265. RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 155–71, 195–96 (1987).
266. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 87; SCHEIBER, supra note 198, at 57.
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war effort, would find herself in 1919 still trying to defend her
267
patriotism.
Between Baldwin’s domestic frame of reference and the
extraordinary pressures being exerted against internationalism, it is
hardly a wonder that the National Civil Liberties Bureau began to
pull back from its internationalist beginnings. The great virtue of the
civil liberties campaign as a wartime program was its ostensibly
patriotic connections to the nation’s constitutive legal traditions. And
with Baldwin’s leadership, the National Civil Liberties Bureau seized
on those traditions to advance a conception of civil liberties
increasingly stripped of internationalist trappings. Gone were the
appeals to do away with the abstraction of the nation-state as a
political form. Gone were the calls for civil liberties as both the
necessary precondition for, and the purpose of, new structures of
international governance. In their place, Baldwin substituted civil
liberties claims couched in the language and traditions of American
nationalism. Affiliates were urged to celebrate the 130th anniversary
268
of the signing of the U.S. Constitution in September 1917. The
Bureau’s challenges to the federal conscription regime, Baldwin
assured, aimed not to obstruct the draft but merely to ensure that the
first draft since the Civil War “not take place without the highest
authority in the country passing upon it squarely.”269 Propaganda
against the draft, Baldwin explained, would cease and be replaced by
270
work narrowly confined to “the lines of legal defense.” “Let us be
patriots in the true sense,” exclaimed a Bureau-affiliated lawyer from
Chicago, perfectly capturing the newly bounded legal horizons of the
Bureau.271 In the Bureau’s devotion to national ideals, a press release
from the fall of 1917 declared, “[W]e believe ourselves to be patriots,
no less sincere and earnest than those who lead our armies to

267. Miss Wald’s War Attitude, N.Y. POST, Jan. 25, 1919, microformed on ACLU Archives,
supra note 11, Reel 6.
268. Letter from Crystal Eastman & Roger Baldwin to American Union Locals, Affiliated
Organizations, Correspondents and Members (Aug. 31, 1917), microformed on Wald Papers,
supra note 138, Reel 102, Folder 2.4.
269. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Lawrence G. Brooks (Sept. 24, 1917), microformed
on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4.
270. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Adolph Germer (Dec. 10, 1917), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 1, vol. 3.
271. Letter from John L. Metzen to Civil Liberties Bureau (Aug. 9, 1917), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 4, vol. 32.
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272
France.” The “cause of civil liberties,” Bureau leaders insisted, was
“loyal” to the “American ideal” of freedom.273 Even Crystal Eastman
took advantage of the opportunities afforded by patriotism: “[T]here
is no more patriotic duty than to keep democracy alive at home,” she
announced.274 Democracy, she concluded, meant the protection of
275
“ancient American liberties.” By the time the Bureau held a
conference in January 1918, the forceful internationalist voices of just
a year before had become muted. Rather than talk about the
relationship between civil liberties and international legal institutions,
Baldwin and his colleagues focused on the protection of civil liberties
in wartime as a “test of the highest type of loyalty”—loyalty not to
global citizenship or to the idea of world federation, but to selfconsciously national ideals.276
***
Three further conferences in the next year—one still widely
remembered, the others now more or less obscure—made clear the
extent to which internationalist energies had waned. 1919 brought
renewed hope to internationalists in the United States and across
Europe. The Paris Peace Conference began in January, with Wilson
promoting the internationalist idea of a League of Nations.277 At the
same time, Jane Addams and the women’s branch of the
internationalist movement assembled at Zurich in a renewed showing
of the radical internationalism that had characterized the Woman’s
Peace Parade at the early stages of the war. Eastman did not attend;
leaders of the Zurich conference feared that the scandal of her
divorce from Bennie and quick remarriage to Walter would
undermine the respect accorded to the conference.278 And though

272. Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 140.
273. Letter from Norman Thomas to Lillian D. Wald, supra note 249.
274. Letter from Crystal Eastman to Editor of the New York Tribune (Aug. 28, 1917),
microformed on Wald Papers, supra note 138, Reel 1, Folder 1.6.
275. Id.
276. Letter from National Civil Liberties Bureau to Friends (Jan. 5, 1918), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 1, vol. 3; see also WALKER, supra note 9, at 53 (describing
ways in which Baldwin and other early ACLU advocates worked to “capture the symbols of
Americanism for the cause of civil liberties”).
277. GEORGE W. EGERTON, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE CREATION OF THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS: STRATEGY, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1914–1919, at 138–40
(1978); KNOCK, supra note 154, at 194–245; MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS: THE
PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND ITS ATTEMPT TO END WAR 94–98 (2001).
278. ADDAMS, supra note 125, at 152–77; DEBENEDETTI, supra note 87, at 91–92; HERMAN,
supra note 91, at 147.
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many internationalists bitterly opposed the indemnities imposed on
Germany by the Treaty of Versailles that emerged in June, the Treaty
nonetheless established what many internationalists had advocated
for decades: a League of Nations “to promote international co279
operation and to achieve international peace and security.”
At the war’s end, the National Civil Liberties Bureau seemed
poised to preside over a similar rebirth of its own internationalism. In
June, as the Paris Conference wound down, the Bureau proposed an
280
“international conference for the restoration of civil liberties.” The
conference, to take place in New York in October, would reach out
across national boundaries to begin the process of reconstituting
prewar internationalist alliances. The Bureau arranged to cosponsor
the conference with its British counterpart and namesake, the
National Council for Civil Liberties. Indeed, Eastman and her
husband Walter Fuller, with whom she had moved to London several
months before, took the lead in organizing the British side of the
event.281 Moreover, early signs suggested that the conference would
resonate powerfully with the internationalist tradition. Arthur
Ponsonby of the British antiwar organization Union for Democratic
Control suggested that the conference might help create the
282
“foundation of an enlightened and democratic internationalism.” B.
N. Langdon-Davies of the National Council for Civil Liberties
similarly assured his American counterparts that although the
conference would focus on Anglo-American liberties, it would not cut
against “the wider internationalism we all seek.”283 Early programs
thus suggested that the conference would focus heavily on such issues
as the “International Aspects of Civil Liberty,” and topics like “Why
Freedom Matters—International Co-operation.”284

279. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT pmbl.
280. Letter from Albert De Silver to B. N. Langdon-Davies (June 6, 1919), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73.
281. Id.; Letter from B. N. Langdon-Davies to Albert De Silver (June 30, 1919),
microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73.
282. Letter from Arthur Ponsonby (n.d.), microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11,
Reel 9, vol. 73; Letter from Walter Fuller to Albert De Silver (Aug. 5, 1919), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73.
283. Letter from B. N. Langon-Davies to Mr. Furnas (Aug. 27, 1919), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73.
284. Letter from Albert De Silver to Lillian D. Wald (Oct. 2, 1919), microformed on Wald
Papers, supra note 138 (enclosing the tentative program for the Conference).
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In some respects, the conference was a smashing success. Though
Eastman’s old teacher Franklin Giddings refused to come (Giddings
had supported U.S. intervention in the war), leading figures in
American law such as Zachariah Chafee Jr., Felix Frankfurter, and
Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School, all of whom were
assuming important places in the early history of civil liberties in
American law, came down from Cambridge for the event. Their
prominence and their close connections to men on the Supreme
Court and in the White House meant that support for the protection
of civil liberties had moved from the eclectic margins of radical
internationalism into the corridors of power.285
From the internationalist perspective, however, the conference
failed. Wilson had struggled mightily since his return from Paris to
persuade the Senate to ratify his internationalist treaty.286 At the
Anglo-American
Tradition
of
Liberty
Conference,
too,
internationalism foundered on the shoals of nationalist passions and
difficult details. The conference was full of the high rhetoric of prewar
internationalism. Speakers denounced “old assumptions of
sovereignty and national honor” as ideas that “belong to the Middle
Ages.”287 “Liberty is not national,”288 delegates declared, and they
called for an internationalist system that would move beyond the
“territorial basis”289 of the nation-state and beyond the “nationalistic
290
segregation of peoples.” But in the new era of the League and the
Paris Conference, the platitudes of prewar internationalism were no
longer sufficient. Concrete proposals for international structures were
the order of the day. Yet the extraordinary complexity of the
international question and the impracticality of internationalist ideas

285. Letter from Zachariah Chafee Jr. to Albert De Silver (Oct. 8, 1919), microformed on
ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73; Letter from Albert De Silver to Felix
Frankfurter (Oct. 7, 1919), microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73;
Letter from Albert De Silver to Roscoe Pound (Oct. 7, 1919), microformed on ACLU Archives,
supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73; Letter from Franklin H. Giddings to Albert De Silver (Oct. 7,
1919), microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11, Reel 9, vol. 73.
286. COOPER, supra note 175, at 340–45; KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 359–62; KNOCK, supra
note 154, at 246–76.
287. CONFERENCE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF LIBERTY, VERBATIM
REPORT (New York, N.Y., Oct. 1919), at 522, microformed on ACLU Archives, supra note 11,
Reel 9, vol. 73.
288. Id. at 554.
289. Id. at 523.
290. Id. at 554.
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291
quickly became apparent. Delegates who favored gradual evolution
toward internationalism clashed with those who urged immediate
internationalist initiatives. Socialists clashed with liberals.
Protonationalists from colonized regions like India and Ireland
insisted on the priority of national independence over international
structures, even as internationalists sought to subordinate nationalism
to transnational institutions.292 Finding “a formula between
nationalism and internationalism,” as Norman Thomas put it, proved
impossible.293 By the final day of the conference, those in attendance
were riven with dissension. The conference, Thomas warned, was “in
294
danger of being lost in an unnecessary bog.” Debates over
internationalism threatened to “wreck” the conference, cautioned
295
another participant. And so they did. Just four weeks after Wilson’s
famous stroke ensured the demise of the League of Nations in the
U.S. Senate, the last gasp of wartime radical internationalism
collapsed in a mess of differences and recriminations.296
What the assembled participants in the Anglo-American
Tradition of Liberty Conference could agree on was the value of civil
liberties. Within a few months of the close of the conference, Baldwin
reorganized the National Civil Liberties Bureau as the American
297
Civil Liberties Union. The ACLU would continue to monitor
international events, including the demise of the British National
Council for Civil Liberties in 1920. But almost from the moment of its
founding, Baldwin and the ACLU sought to obscure the
organization’s internationalist beginnings. The Bureau, the ACLU’s
organizers contended in 1920, had not been an “antiwar
organization,”298 but rather an organization that “insisted on
American constitutional rights.”299 Already in 1920, the center of
attention for civil libertarians had shifted away from the question of
war resistance and opposition to militarism, to the problem of the
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300
“radicals, especially the I.W.W. . . . and the Socialists.” “Radicalism,
not the attitude to the war,” now seemed the motivating factor in
301
most instances of attacks on civil liberties. The ACLU thus
organized itself to defend “peaceful picketing” and “trade unionism”
and to fight discrimination against radicals and labor unions.302 Just as
the ACLU would later purge communists from its ranks, the early
303
ACLU had washed itself clean of its internationalist origins.

CONCLUSION
What is striking about the development of a new language of
civil liberties in American law between 1917 and 1920 is that it took
part in both the modernist and the traditional idioms that the war
occasioned. Historians have long debated the cultural consequences
of the Great War. Some hold that the attempt to make sense of the
brutal violence of modern nation-states touched off a deep shift
toward the ironic and the modernist.304 Others argue that the war
occasioned a powerful return to traditionalist rhetorics as a
mechanism for coping with the apparent senselessness of the war. In
Jay Winter’s influential formulation, for example, the war revived “a
number of traditional languages” expressed in “unusual and modern
forms.”305
Like Winter’s distinctly modern traditionalists, lawyers such as
Eastman responded to the war and to the rise of newly powerful state
institutions by reinvigorating the familiar languages of rights and
liberties that they had only recently rejected as Victorian
anachronisms. For Eastman and her colleagues, the turn to rights
advanced a strikingly modernist project in international law. The
abstraction of rights seemed to offer a way to contain the dangerous
abstraction of state sovereignty. Eastman’s internationalist
appropriations of a traditional language of rights and liberties, in
other words, were themselves deeply ironized. They sought to pick
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303. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 130–33 (describing the 1940 purging of prominent
radicals from the ACLU).
304. See FUSSELL, supra note 7, at 21.
305. JAY WINTER, SITES OF MEMORY, SITES OF MOURNING: THE GREAT WAR IN
EUROPEAN CULTURAL HISTORY 9, 18 (1995).
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and choose among the totems of a national tradition so as
strategically to advance a modern internationalist agenda, identifying
the abstraction of rights as more useful (and less dangerous) than the
abstraction of sovereignty. The new civil liberties movement of the
twentieth century was thus the product of a kind of double
disillusionment with the fixtures of nineteenth-century legal
thought—rights and states. And yet in the searing heat of wartime
patriotism, internationalist modernism quickly gave way to more
straightforwardly traditional arguments rooted ever more deeply in
the trappings of American national identity. The traditional language
of rights overwhelmed the internationalist agenda that the rhetoric of
rights had been marshaled to advance. Indeed, within a few short
years, Baldwin’s recrafting of the civil liberties movement would
obscure almost completely the movement’s international law
beginnings.
Eastman herself refused to compromise with the imperatives of
the nation-state. As John Haynes Holmes later remembered,
Eastman “could not, or more likely would not, surrender the
idealism” that had brought her to the internationalist cause.306 She
therefore never embraced the Bill of Rights and civil liberties as
wholeheartedly as Baldwin did, strategically or otherwise. The First
Amendment, she wrote from London, had “never” been “any good in
a crisis”; it had “never been proof against a strain.”307 As labor unions,
socialists, and the ACLU turned to civil liberties to advance their
causes, she contended that those safeguards had never been “of much
practical value in protecting the poorest workers.”308 Especially after
U.S. intervention in Russia in 1918, Eastman’s own views radicalized
dramatically. By 1920, she adopted a form of Bolshevik communism.
A “capitalist state,” she wrote, would never “maintain democratic
309
Even in the woman’s
institutions against its own interest.”
movement in which she had worked for legal change since childhood,
Eastman lost hope in the reform possibilities of the law. Feminism
could “most assuredly” not accomplish real sex equality through legal
change, she argued; sex discrimination was instead a problem “of
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310
education, of early training.” “We must,” she concluded, “bring up
311
feminist sons.”
Eastman, it seems, had encountered limits to lawyering. In
Eastman’s day, as still in our own, the authority of law and of lawyers
derived principally from the very sovereign states that Eastman
sought to critique. Lawyering therefore seemed to come with
powerful institutional limits. To be sure, nation-state institutions were
not immune to legal change. The United States’s constitutive legal
documents, for example, provided resources on which Eastman and
her colleagues drew to launch the modern civil liberties movement.
Over the succeeding decades, moreover, international lawyers—
walking in the footsteps of internationalists before them—would
make painstaking progress in establishing human rights norms to
constrain sovereignty’s prerogatives.312 But institutions also proved
powerfully resistant to the transformations that Eastman and the
radical internationalists had sought to bring about. If for almost a
century lawyer-skeptics have turned to the abstraction of civil
liberties, perhaps they have done so because of the persistent power
of the abstraction of sovereignty.
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